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This dissertation introduces a game theoretic modeling framework and a series of 
models to examine the interactions between the key stakeholders (property owners, 
insurers, reinsurers and government) of a natural catastrophe insurance market, which 
possesses a complicated structure and faces many challenges from the natural 
catastrophe loss. Specifically, we integrate (1) a utility-based homeowner decision 
model; (2) a stochastic optimization model to optimize reinsurance decision by the 
primary insurer(s); (3) a heuristic government intervention model to reduce uninsured 
losses through price support for insurance purchase and acquisition; and (4) a state-of-
the-art regional catastrophe loss estimation model, all within the framework of a static 
Cournot-Nash noncooperative game assuming perfect information. We allow the 
number of primary insurers to increase from one (monopoly) to many (oligopoly) 
within the Cournot-Nash framework, and examines the impacts of competition on 
market performance from each stakeholder’s perspective. An automatic Response-
Surface and Trust-Region algorithm is developed to solve the models for real, regional 
applications. A case study for residential wood frame buildings in Eastern North 
Carolina is presented. The case study suggests that: (a) private insurance market 
competition is an efficient mechanism to reduce uninsured loss, which should be 
facilitated by government; (b) more competition challenges insurers but benefits 
homeowners, and there exists a balance between insurer profitability and insurance 
penetration; (c) acquisition, price support and encouraging insurers to keep catastrophe 
 reserve can all improve market performance and reduce uninsured loss; and (d) 
catastrophe reserves should be encouraged, which not only help insurers to avoid 
insolvency, but could also limit competition if imposed as barrier of entry, thus 
improve their profitability. 
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CHAPTER 1 
MODELING COMPETITION IN A MARKET FOR NATRUAL CATASTROPHE 
INSURANCE 
 
1. CATASTROPHE INSURANCE MARKET 
Substantial growth in coastal populations has led to a dramatic increase in the  
consequences of natural disasters (Kunreuther 1998). Natural disaster catastrophe loss 
insurance is one mechanism to address this growing risk.  Unfortunately, this market 
faces many challenges leaving many properties either uninsured or substantially under 
insured. Many have proposed possible explanations for challenges to the catastrophe 
risk insurance market, related to both the nature of catastrophe risk itself and the 
structure of the market. In particular, catastrophe losses tend to be highly correlated in 
space and characterized by “fat tail” distributions, making it especially difficult for an 
insurer to avoid the possibility of insolvency (e.g., Kousky and Cooke 2012). The 
difficulty in precisely estimating catastrophe risk, limited insurer capacity to cover 
potentially large losses, biases in building owners manifested in insurance purchase 
decisions, moral hazard, charity hazard, and tax and agency costs of holding capital all 
have been noted as possible contributors to the difficulties in establishing a healthy 
catastrophe insurance market (e.g., Jaffee and Russell 1997; Froot 2001; Kunreuther et 
al. 2002; Kunreuther 2006; Kousky 2011; Paudel 2012). Also, Grace et al. (1998), 
Grace et al. (2003), Kleindorfer and Klein (2003), and Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 
(2009) identify a passive supply-demand relationship and likely inefficient and 
misguided government intervention as conditions that have exacerbated the stress on 
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the market.  
With respect to demand, property owners often do not fully insure their property nor 
do they invest in pre-event mitigation activities that can reduce losses (Kunreuther 
1996; Kreisel and Landry 2004; Kunreuther and Pauly 2004; Dixon et al. 2006). 
Property owners are likely to have insufficient financial resources to recover losses 
and may demand government relief (Kunreuther and Pauly 2004). Major disasters are 
often followed by large, unplanned government expenditures that create major 
difficulties for local and state government budgets. Developed under the time and 
political pressure of a post-disaster situation, they are often poorly managed, uneven 
and inefficient (Kunreuther and Pauly 2006). Moreover, property owners’ over-
reliance on post-disaster relief from the government may crowd out the private 
insurance market (Kunreuther and Pauly 2004).  
On the supply side, insurers receive a stable flow of premiums to address a liability 
stream that is highly variable. This mismatch between stable receipts and sporadic but 
very large expenditures must be addressed through intertemporal risk spreading, which 
is difficult to achieve (Jaffee and Russell 1997). For example, some data from 
reinsurance companies implies that insurance companies tend to retain, rather than 
share their large-event risk.  In fact, the vast majority of primitive catastrophe risk in 
the economy is being retained (Froot 2001). Due to the difficulty in managing risk, 
insurers have limited renewals of existing contracts and issuing of new contracts in at-
risk region (US GAO 2007b). In the worst case, disaster events can cause insolvency, 
as happened, for example, to eight small Florida insurance companies after Hurricane 
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Andrew (Grier 1996). Despite of the challenges for insurers to survive, state 
legislators and insurance regulators appear to have suppressed insurance prices, 
compressed rate differences between high and low risk areas and imposed significant 
cross-subsidies from low-risk to high-risk areas (Kleindorfer and Klein 2003).  
Given the complexity of insurance markets with the potential for catastrophic loss, 
there is a clear need for comprehensive examination of the interactions between key 
stakeholders (property owners, insurers, reinsurers, and government) so that effective 
ways to restructure the catastrophe loss insurance market can be identified. In this 
study, we use a game theoretic modeling framework to capture the strategic 
relationship of one or more insurers with the other stakeholders in the market. Within 
this framework, we examine performance of a voluntary catastrophe insurance market 
as the level of competition within that market changes. More specifically, we integrate 
(1) a utility-based homeowner decision model; (2) a stochastic optimization model to 
optimize reinsurance decisions by the primary insurer(s); and (3) a state-of-the-art 
regional catastrophe loss estimation model, all within the framework of a static 
Cournot-Nash noncooperative game assuming perfect information. We allow the 
number of primary insurers to increase from one (monopoly) to many within the 
Cournot-Nash framework.
1
 In addition, we analyze a cooperative solution for each 
level of market concentration by symmetric insurers. Although we use a single shot 
Cournot-Nash game to model the interaction between insurers, by also characterizing 
the cooperative (joint profit maximizing) solution we can benchmark the range of 
                                                 
1
 A standard exercise of the symmetric Cournot-Nash model with n constant marginal cost firms can 
demonstrate that when n=1 the monopoly solution obtains, n=2 yields the duopoly solution and as n 
approaches infinity, Cournot-Nash converges on the perfectly competitive solution. 
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outcomes viable under a repeated game with trigger strategies for all possible discount 
rates. 
This modeling framework is applied to a full-scale case study for hurricane risk (flood 
and wind combined) for residential buildings in Eastern North Carolina. We assume 
heterogeneous homeowners and insurers with identical cost structures, and focus on 
the equilibrium supply-demand relationship under conditions that range from 
monopoly and oligopoly to market structures that emulate near perfect competition. 
Furthermore, we examine impacts of market concentration on the profitability and 
insolvency of a single insurer, as well as its decisions to hedge risk as the number of 
insurers increases.  
This study is novel in that it represents an integration of a classical form of game 
theoretic strategic interaction with individual optimization models for key stakeholders, 
and a data-driven regional catastrophe loss model that provides a disaggregated 
representation of the risk to be managed. Further, we illustrate how this new model 
can be applied in a case study. 
Following a summary of relevant literature in Section 2, the formulation of the single 
shot Cournot-Nash model is described in Section 3. Application of the Cournot-Nash 
model requires defining inverse demand functions and an insurer cost function. In 
Section 4, we present a modeling framework that includes interacting models of loss, 
homeowner decisions, and insurer decisions, and show how it can be used to develop 
those required functions. Section 5 presents inputs required for the case study 
application for hurricane risk to residential buildings in Eastern North Carolina. The 
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case study results are presented in Section 6, including discussion of how equilibrium 
price, insurance penetration, insurer’s performance, and reinsurance decisions change 
as the number of insurers in the market increases. Finally, the summary of this 
research as well opportunities for future work is presented in Section 7. 
2. REVIEW OF INSURANCE MARKET MODELS 
Based on empirical analysis, catastrophe loss insurance is a form of property and 
liability insurance in which competition is usually characterized by an oligopolistic 
market structure (Nissan and Caveny 2001; Murat et al. 2002). Furthermore, the 
catastrophe insurance market is highly regulated in terms of entry and exit, capital 
availability, and pricing. Given the nature of the product and the current regulatory 
climate, a voluntary insurance market is generally oligopolistic.  
The theoretical insurance literature has focused primarily on a monopoly insurer, 
monopolistically competitive market structure in which insurers compete with 
heterogeneous but highly substitutable insurance products, or perfect competition 
(e.g., Joskow 1973; Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976; Stiglitz 1977; Spence 1978). There 
are a few models of oligopolistic insurance markets for which the insurers make 
positive profits. Sonnenholzner and Wambach (2004) gives an excellent overview of 
these models. Among the papers on oligopolistic insurance markets, Schlesinger and 
Schulenburg (1991) analyze a model with heterogeneous insurance products and 
Polborn (1998) applies the Bertrand game to model oligopolistic interactions between 
risk-averse insurers.  
Cournot-Nash and Bertrand models of oligopoly markets can be represented as 
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classical static non-cooperative games (Tirole 1988; Lynne and Dan 2008). The 
Bertrand framework has been used to represent oligopoly insurance markets—where 
players/insurers compete based on price (e.g., Polborn 1998; Sonnenholzner and 
Wambach 2004). For a homogeneous good, the standard Bertrand model of price 
competition with no capacity constraints implies that the perfectly competitive zero-
profit solution with equilibrium price equal to marginal cost will obtain with as few as 
two players. Generally this result is not consistent with empirical evidence. Therefore, 
most of the oligopoly insurance models consider product differentiation and/or 
imperfect information (e.g., Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976; Stiglitz 1977; Spence 1978; 
Schlesigner and Schulenburg 1991; Polborn 1998; Wambach 2000). In contrast, when 
there is quantity or Cournot-Nash competition, even for homogeneous products, prices 
can remain substantially above marginal cost so long as the number of players is not 
large. Given that there is little evidence of economies of scale in this industry (Hill 
1979), we assume Cournot-Nash competition under perfect information with a 
homogeneous insurance product at the market equilibrium price per unit of expected 
loss. 
The static Cournot-Nash model has players interacting only once. The reality, of 
course, is that insurers/players are involved in strategic interactions repeatedly. In such 
a setting, issues such as learning, establishing a reputation, and credibility can become 
quite important. Dynamic game-theoretic models have been applied to address these 
issues and model oligopolistic competition (e.g., Abreu 1983; Alos-Ferrer, Ania et al. 
1998; Huck, Normann et al. 1999; Kesternich and Schumacher 2009; Abbring and 
Campbell 2010). In infinitely repeated games, collusive (joint profit maximizing) 
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outcomes can be supported as a stable solution using credible punishment strategies. 
Playing the static Cournot-Nash strategy forever is a credible punishment strategy in 
the repeated game and the best outcome for all players in the game is the static 
collusive solution. Although we have not utilized a dynamic framework, we are able to 
characterize the range of possible outcomes by identifying the Cournot-Nash solution 
and the joint profit maximizing solution for each number of players.  
Finally, though problems of moral hazard and adverse selection have been addressed 
in the general insurance industry (e.g., Bernnardo and Chiappori 2003; De Feo and 
Hindriks 2005; Villeneuve 2005), we do not address them here because they tend not 
to be as important for catastrophe insurance, since the event creating the risk is beyond 
the control of those who are insured (Russell and Jaffee 1997). 
3. COURNOT-NASH MODEL OF CATASTROPHE INSRUANCE 
MARKETS 
Our base case of oligopolistic behavior in the catastrophe loss market is a single shot 
noncooperative game, in which each insurer forms a best-response strategy (i.e., 
volume of business in the region(s)) that maximizes net profit recognizing the best-
response strategies (and capabilities) of its competitors. All insurers in the market 
compete once and make their decisions simultaneously. We assume that there are no 
disparities in information and all players (private insurers) are homogeneous. In other 
words, each insurer faces the same cost structure, and is equally capable of handling 
all levels of demand at market price level. Further, we assume that insurers always 
offer full coverage so that pricing is expressed as the premium per unit of coverage, 
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which is the same across all insurers; and each property owner, at most, only 
purchases one insurance contract from a single insurer. Furthermore, by symmetry, 
total sales at the equilibrium price will be divided evenly geographically and with 
respect the vulnerability of the building inventory, which will result in the same 
expected net profit for each insurer.  
More specifically, consider n homogeneous private insurers selling catastrophe 
insurance for residential buildings in a region. We assume the region is divided into 
smaller risk regions v V  defined to allow homeowner risk attitudes and insurer 
premiums to vary geographically. Insurer j’s decisions in the Cournot-Nash game—
the total coverage offered in each risk region v  is denoted as 
vjq , in terms of annual 
expected insured loss (from natural disasters). The price (per unit) of insurance 
policies sold in a risk region is assumed to have a relationship with the total volume 
offered by all insurers in this region. More specifically, assume that there is a distinct 
demand function for each risk region: ( ),  v v vQ D p v V   , with its inverse: 
1( ) ( ),  v v v v vp P Q D Q v V
    , where vQ  refers to the total insured loss by all 
insurers in the entire region and 
vp  refers to price per dollar coverage. Since the total 
insured losses actually come from all the insurers in the market, a single insurer j’s 
price-demand relationship also depends on its rivals’ actions, and can be presented as:  
( , ) ( , )v v vj vk v vj vjk jp P q q P q Q  . The cost function for insurer j to operate the 
business in all risk regions is denoted as ( )j vjv VC q . Finally, insurer j’s annual net 
profit can be described as the premiums paid to insurer j by those they insure minus 
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the cost of providing the insurance over a year (Eq. 1). Note that the first term price is 
a function of the coverage provided by all insurers since that determines the price, 
while the second term cost is a function of only the coverage offered by insurer j. 
Expressing an individual insurer’s objective as a function of its decisions/strategies 
and its competitors’ facilitates deduction of the equilibrium conditions. 
( , ) ( , ) ( )  0j vj vj vj v vj vj j vj vjv V v V v V v Vq Q q P q Q C q q                (1) 
We assume each insurer is a net profit maximizer and formulates a best response 
function that recognizes the strategic interaction with other insurers serving the same 
locations. If the problem is differentiable, the optimal solution for net profit 
maximization should satisfy the first order conditions (Eq. 2), based on the envelope 
theorem (Mas-Colell et al. 1995), which also refers to the relationship that marginal 
cost equals to marginal revenue: 
( )( , )
( , ) 0
j vjj v vj vj v V
v vj vj vj
vj vj vj
C qP q Q
P q Q q
q q q
  

 
   
  

          (2) 
Denote insurer j’s actions that satisfy the first order conditions as a vector of reaction 
functions (i.e., coverage provided in each region v , or best responses): 
( , )j vjq v V  q . Since the insurers are all homogeneous, they will have the same 
reaction functions. Thus, by symmetry, we would have insurer j’s rivals’ actions as: 
*( 1) ,  vj vjQ n q v V     . By substituting these relations into the first order conditions 
(Eq. 2), they can be rewritten as: 
*
* *
( )( )
( ) 0    
j vjv vj v V
v vj vj
vj vj
C qP nq
P nq q v V
q q


    
 

            (3) 
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Solving Equations 3 explicitly, the reaction function (best response function of insurer 
j), denoted as 1V   vector ( )j j jR q q , where jq  refers to all its opponents’ 
reactions, and each term of the vector has a closed form as: 
*
*
*
[ ( ) / ] ( )
( ):     
( ) /
j vj vj v vjv V
j j vj
v vj vj
C q q P nq
R q v V
P nq q




  
  
 



q               (4) 
The reaction functions are an intermediate step to solving for the Nash equilibrium and 
examining the stability of the equilibrium. Denote the cross partial of reaction function 
for firm j to its rival i’s actions as  , ( )
j
i
R
j i


q
, which is a V V  matrix. Then, the 
partial derivative matrix as defined in Zhang and Zhang (1996), denoted as 'T , has 
the following form:  
1 1
2
2 2
'
1
1 1
0
0
0
n
n
n n
n nV nV
R R
R R
T
R R
 
  
  
 
  
    
 
 
  
   
q q
q q
q q
                   (5) 
The sufficient condition of a stable Cournot-Nash equilibrium requires the partial 
derivative matrix of all players to have a norm of less than unity (Zhang and Zhang 
1996), i.e., ' 1T  .  
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4. HOMEOWNER AND INSURER DECISION MODELS TO COMPUTE 
INVERSE DEMAND AND COST FUNCTIONS 
Application of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium model in Section 3 requires defining 
inverse demand functions ,  vp v V   and a cost function ( )j vjv VC q , for 
simplicity, denoted as ( )j vjvC q  or jC . A key contribution of this work is to 
demonstrate how those functions can be developed using a modeling framework that 
includes interacting models of loss, homeowner decisions, and insurer decisions. This 
section describes the framework, and then how it is used to define the functions 
needed for the Cournot-Nash model. For ease of discussion, the modeling framework 
is described for hurricane risk and single-family residential buildings specifically, but 
it could be adapted to earthquakes or other extreme events and other types of 
buildings. 
4.1 Overview of interacting loss and decision models  
The framework is illustrated for each primary insurer. It includes three models and 
represents three main players (Fig. 1.1). The loss model is a simulation that combines 
hazard, inventory, and damage modules to compute a probability distribution of losses 
for each group of buildings (defined by location and type) and each possible hurricane 
in the study area. The inputs required are similar to those that can be obtained from 
any regional loss estimation model, such as, HAZUS-MH 2.1 (FEMA 2012) or the 
Florida Public Hurricane Loss Model (2005). The primary insurer and homeowners 
interact in a way in which the insurer determines what premiums to charge for policies 
at a specified deductible, and what reinsurance to purchase, and each homeowner 
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(defined by his home’s location and type) responds by deciding whether or not to 
purchase insurance. Specifically, the primary insurer model is a simulation 
optimization in which the objective is to maximize net profit. Each homeowner’s 
decision-making is modeled as a utility maximization problem by choosing between 
buying insurance and bearing risk him/herself. Though other options (of dealing with 
catastrophe risk) such as relocating would be realistic, they are beyond the scope of 
this study and thus not considered as homeowner’s decisions. The homeowner and 
loss models together are used to develop the inverse demand functions (Section 4.3).  
The interactions between the insurer model and the homeowners’ decisions are then 
used to develop the cost function (Section 4.4). 
Figure 1.1 Structure of interacting models 
4.2 Definitions  
Building inventory. The inventory of residential buildings is divided into groups, 
where each is defined by its geographic area unit or location i (e.g., census tract), 
building category m, resistance level c, and risk region v. Building categories m are 
defined based on architectural features and are assumed to perform similarly in 
hurricanes and have similar value (e.g., one-story home with a garage and hip roof). A 
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building’s resistance level c represents its vulnerability and is a function of structural 
details that define the probability of damage given wind speed and flood depth. As 
defined in Section 3, risk regions v are larger geographic areas comprised of many 
area units i. They are defined to allow homeowner risk attitudes and insurer premiums 
to vary by location, but at greater aggregation than area units. The building inventory, 
which we assume to be constant over time, is defined using 
imcvX , the number of 
buildings of type i, m, c, v. 
Stakeholders. The collection of homeowners in the study area are disaggregated 
based on their homes’ location i, building category m, building resistance level c, and 
risk region v. Since homeowners differ based on their i, m, c, v type (and therefore 
risk), and possibly their risk attitude, the model does not assume they will all make the 
same decisions but instead captures the heterogeneous behavior of homeowners. We 
assume all insurers are homogenous net profit maximizers and will purchase one layer 
of catastrophe risk excess of loss reinsurance to manage/transfer part of their 
liabilities. Capital markets are not considered for these primary insurers. The 
reinsurance market is assumed to accommodate primary insurers’ insurance demand at 
a standard price level. 
Time. The durations of the time steps t vary (a few days to a few weeks). They are 
defined to be short enough so that we can reasonably assume no two hurricanes occur 
in the same time period, and so that the probability a hurricane occurs in one time 
period is equal across time periods. Since hurricane occurrence varies during the year, 
this means the time periods are shorter, for example, in September when hurricanes 
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are more likely than in June when they are less likely.  
Hazard. The model includes coverage for both hurricane-related wind and storm 
surge flooding. The hurricane hazard is represented by an efficient set of probabilistic 
hurricane scenarios (1, , )h H , defined as tracks with along-track parameters that 
determine the intensity, including central pressure deficit and radius to maximum 
winds. Each hurricane scenario has an associated hazard-adjusted annual occurrence 
probability hP  such that when probabilistically combined, the set of hurricane 
scenarios represents the regional hazard (Apivatanagul et al. 2011). For each 
hurricane, wind speeds and surge depths are estimated throughout the study area; in a 
sense, each hurricane scenario represents all hurricanes that would produce similar 
wind speeds and surge depths in the study area. The occurrence probability for period t 
is calculated from the annual occurrence probability using the historical relative 
frequency of events over the course of the hurricane season (Peng 2013).  
A series of hurricanes in quick succession can generate very different outcomes for an 
insurer than the same hurricanes evenly spread over time. We therefore define a long-
term (thirty-year) timeline of hurricanes as a scenario (1, , )s S . (To avoid 
confusion, we refer to a single hurricane event scenario as simply a hurricane h.) Each 
scenario s is a 1 T  vector, where T is total number of time periods, and for each 
time period t, either one of the possible hurricanes h occurs, or no hurricane occurs. 
For ease of notation, we refer to the case of no hurricane as 1h H  . Each scenario 
has an occurrence probability sP , such that 1s
s
P  . The complete set of scenarios 
(on the order of hundreds or perhaps thousands) is defined so that it has the same key 
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characteristics as the full set of ( 1)TH   scenarios that is theoretically possible. See 
Peng (2013) for more details on the creation of the suite of scenarios.  
4.3 Deriving inverse demand functions  
The demand for catastrophe insurance is assumed to be separable by risk region v, so 
there exist V independent inverse demand curves, i.e., price-demand relationships 
( )v v vp P Q . To develop that curve for one region v, we solve the homeowner decision 
model for every homeowner in the region at a specified price level 
vp  (i.e., price per 
dollar coverage in risk region v) to compute the demand 
vQ  (i.e., total expected 
coverage in region v) at that price level. Repeating the calculation for many values of 
vp , we obtain the  paired data, ( , )v vp Q , which we then use to fit an inverse demand 
curve. 
The homeowner decision model is defined on an annual basis and for a single 
homeowner in location i, building category m, resistance level c, and risk region v. It 
can be solved separately for homeowners in buildings of each type i, m, c, v, and thus 
the computation can be parallelized. For a homeowner of type i, m, c, v, the model 
determines whether or not to buy insurance at the specified price 
vp  given a 
specified deductible d. Specifically, it yields the binary decision variable 
imcvw , which 
is one if insurance is purchased, and zero otherwise. 
We denote the loss in the event of hurricane h, for a single home of type i, m, c, v, as 
h
imcvL , which is estimated from the loss model. The annual premium, denoted as imcvZ , 
is defined as the price per dollar coverage times the annual expected loss (Eq. 6), and 
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the amount the homeowner actually pays as a deductible in the event of hurricane h is 
the minimum of the loss experienced and the deductible (Eq. 7).  
    , , ,h himcv v imcvhZ p P L i m c v                       (6) 
 =min ,      , , ,h himcv imcvB L d i m c v                      (7) 
We assume each homeowner has a maximum budget for homeowner insurance equal 
to a specified percentage 
vk  of his home value mV  (Eq. 8); and insurers will only 
offer insurance if the premium is greater than some specified value   (Eq. 9). 
Finally, the decision variables 
imcvw  must be zero or one. 
   , , ,imcv v mZ k V i m c v                           (8) 
   , , ,imcvZ i m c v                            (9) 
 0,  1   , , ,imcvw i m c v                         (10) 
We assume the decision is made by maximizing utility, with risk preferences 
represented by the utility function ( ) 1 imcvxU x e   , where imcv  is the Arrow-Pratt 
measure of risk aversion for homeowners of type i, m, c, v . For 0imcv   
homeowners are risk averse, which is necessary for insurance to be a possibility. In the 
case study, we assume the values of 
imcv  within a risk region v are lognormally 
distributed with a specified mean log( )v  and a standard deviation of one (Eq. 11). 
log( ) ~ (log( ),1)    , , ,imcv vN i m c v                    (11) 
The homeowner’s objective function (Eq. 12) is to maximize the probability weighted 
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sum of utilities over all possible hurricanes h if he buys insurance (first term) and if he 
does not (second term). In the first case, the homeowner pays the premium and loss up 
to the deductible. In the second case, the homeowner pays the loss due to building 
damage only. Note that when 1h H  , no hurricane occurs, and the loss is zero. 
      (1 )h h h himcv imcv imcv imcv imcvh hMax w P U Z B w P U L                  (12) 
The homeowner model is defined by optimizing the objective function (12) subject to 
Constraints (6) to (10). We denote the solution to that model for a homeowner of type  
i, m, c, v as 
imcvw . If imcvX  is the number of buildings of i, m, c, v then the total 
expected insured loss 
vQ  for insurers at price level vp  and deductible d is as given 
in Eq. 13. Computing 
vQ  for many different prices vp , we can then fit an inverse 
demand function  ( )v v vp P Q . 
* ( )    h hv imcv imcv imcvimc hQ w P L X v                  (13) 
A logical extension of this work would be to replace the homeowner formulation with 
a discrete choice model or other formulation that accounts for some of the documented 
homeowner biases and heuristics (Kunreuther 2006). 
4.4 Defining cost function  
The cost function in the Cournot-Nash model ( )j vjvC q  defines the cost for insurer 
j to operate the business in all risk regions v, and is a function of all 
vjq , the policies 
written by insurer j in each risk region v (i.e., total expected insured losses in region 
v). We compute this function in three steps. First, given a price per dollar coverage 
vp , we use the insurer optimization model to determine how much risk the insurer 
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will transfer (specifically, the attachment point A and maximum limit M of the excess 
of loss reinsurance treaty) so as to maximize its profit. As described in Section 4.1, the 
insurer optimization interacts with the homeowner model, which determines which 
homeowners will buy insurance *
imcvw , and thus the homeowner demand vjq  at the 
specified price level. Second, given the homeowner demand and reinsurance treaty 
parameters, we can calculate the cost to the insurer 
jC . Third, we repeat that 
calculation for different price levels 
vp  and combine it with the homeowner demand 
to obtain a set of data triplets  ( , , )v vj jp q C . Finally, we fit a cost function to that data 
that relates 
jC  to vjq  for each risk region v, which can be used as input in the 
Cournot-Nash model. In Section 4.4.1, we define insurer cost more precisely, and in 
Section 4.4.2 we present the insurer decision model formulation. 
4.4.1 Definition of insurer cost 
We approximate the insurer’s total cost in this model as the sum of the operational 
costs and insurer’s liabilities. The operational cost is assumed to be a fixed portion   
(35% in the case study) of annual expected insured losses (i.e., each dollar of coverage 
costs $0.35 for the insurer to provide). Insurer liabilities include the coverage of 
insured homeowner losses reduced by the risk transferred to the reinsurer, plus 
payments to the reinsurer. For the assumption of a single layer of catastrophe risk 
excess of loss reinsurance (Section 4.2), in the event of a hurricane h, the loss to all 
insured buildings hL  is divided among the homeowners, primary insurer, and 
reinsurer as in Figure 1.2. The variables A, M and   are the attachment point, 
maximum limit and co-participation percentage of the reinsurance treaty, respectively. 
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If hurricane h occurs, each homeowner pays the first portion of the loss up to the 
deductible; the reinsurer pays %  of any loss above the attachment point A and up 
to a maximum limit %  of ( )M A ; and the primary insurer pays the remaining 
loss. The excess of loss reinsurance policy itself requires that the insurer pay the 
reinsurer a premium of b, and in the event of a hurricane h, an additional reinstatement 
premium to reinstate the limit M. Overall, the insured losses not covered by the 
deductibles and the reinsurance policy, plus the payments to the reinsurer are 
considered the insurer’s liability. 
 
Figure 1.2 Loss structure showing how loss to insured buildings hL  is divided among 
stakeholders 
Purchasing a reinsurance policy with low attachment point and high limit reduces the 
insured losses/liabilities incurred by the primary insurer thus reducing the risk and 
stabilizing profit over the long term.  However, this must be balanced against the 
result that a high reinsurance premium reduces the primary insurer’s net profit in each 
time period. Interrelated choices about homeowner insurance pricing that affect 
homeowner purchase decisions that, in turn, affect the loss distribution ultimately 
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influence the optimal reinsurance strategy for the primary insurer.  
4.4.2 Insurer decision optimization model 
For a given price level, the insurer determines how much risk to transfer to the 
reinsurer (i.e., values of A and M), by maximizing its expected net profit over the set S 
of long-term hurricane scenarios described in Section 4.2. At price level 
vp , the 
homeowners who purchase insurance *
imcvw , and resulting total demand ( )v v vQ D p , 
are determined by the homeowner model (Section 4.3). The total insured loss hL  (Eq. 
14) and deductibles hB  incurred by homeowners (Eq. 15) are: 
*h h
imcv imcv imcvimcv
L w L X                       (14) 
*h h
imcv imcv imcvimcv
B w B X                       (15) 
Reinsurance coverage. We define hq  to be the loss above A and below M for 
hurricane h (Eq. 16). If the loss exceeds the attachment point A, then hq  is 
recovered from the reinsurer and the primary insurer incurs (1 ) hq , where   is a 
specified input constant (Fig. 2).  
  min max ,  0 ,  -   h hq L A M A h                 (16) 
For a given scenario s and time t, which hurricane h (or no hurricane) happens is 
known, so we can define sye , the loss between attachment A and limit M for scenario 
s and year y in Equation 17, where sthr  is a binary indicator variable that is one if 
hurricane h happens in scenario s at time t and zero otherwise. Since at most one 
hurricane can happen in a time period t, 1  ,sth
h
r s t  . The set ( )y  defines the 
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set of time periods t in year y. 
( )
=   ,sy sth h
t y h
e r q s y

                       (17) 
Reinsurance premium. In each year y, the primary insurer pays the reinsurer a base 
premium b, and in the event of a hurricane h, it also pays a reinstatement premium to 
reinstate the limit M. The base premium is computed as the expected loss the reinsurer 
is responsible for multiplied by one plus a loading factor  , plus the standard 
deviation   of the net reinsurer loss multiplied by   and a user-specified constant 
g (Eq. 18) (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2009). 
(1 ) h h
h
b P q g                           (18) 
The loading factor   represents the reinsurer’s share of the loss adjustment 
expenses, its own expenses, and its profit, and g  represents the reinsurer’s risk 
aversion. The   is the standard deviation over all scenarios s and years y of the 
reinsurer’s loss, sye , less the reinstatement premium for scenario s and year y. The 
reinstatement premium is a pro rata amount of the expected reinsurer loss without 
adjusting for the length of the treaty’s remaining term. That is, it equals the expected 
loss multiplied by the percentage of the original coverage that was used 
( ( ))sye M A . The total reinsurance premium for scenario s in year y, therefore, is the 
sum of the base reinsurance premium and the reinstatement payment: 
  ,
sy
sy h h
h
e
r b P q s y
M A

 
       
                  (19) 
Primary insurer’s profit. Equation (20) defines the insurer’s net profit, syF , in 
scenario s and year y. The terms are, in turn, the total homeowner premiums collected, 
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transaction cost, total loss to insured buildings minus deductibles, actual loss 
recovered from the reinsurer, and reinsurance premium.  
( ) ( )
( )  ,sy sth h sth h sy syv v vv v t y h t y hF p Q Q r L r B e r s y              
(20)  
Primary insurer’s accumulated surplus. In reality, the funds available to the insurer 
at any time would be the policyholder surplus, which is defined as the insurer’s 
admitted assets minus its liabilities, i.e., its net worth. In this model, we treat the profit 
accumulated in previous periods as the policyholder surplus, and thus we ignore the 
effect of investments and other lines of business. We assume the company starts its 
business at time 0y   with a surplus (denoted as 0s ) equal to k times the annual 
premiums 
imcvZ  (Eq. 6) received from homeowners of all building inventories in all 
risk regions, where k is a user-specified constant (Eq. 21).  
0   s imcvimcvk Z s                          (21) 
To determine the surplus sy  in each year, we make two alternative assumptions, and 
for each model run, we choose one (i.e., either Equation 22a or 22b is included in the 
formulation, but not both). In the capped surplus version (Eq. 22a), we assume the 
primary insurer reallocates surplus greater that this amount in each year y by 
reinvesting in other lines of business or distributing it to investors as dividends. The 
surplus in scenario s and year y then is the minimum of the sum of the profit in y and 
the surplus in 1y  , and the maximum allowable surplus imcvimcvk Z  (Eq. 22a).  
 , 1min ,   ,sy s y sy imcvimcvF k Z s y 
                 (22a) 
Our model allows for an alternative to reinsurance through a retained taxed surplus 
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version in which the primary insurer might at least partially self-insure. In that case, 
we remove the cap on the surplus and instead assume the insurer will reinvest all after-
tax surpluses within this business, where the tax rate is . As such, these investments 
are considered to be a reserve available to pay homeowners claims in extreme events, 
and the surplus in scenario s and year y is defined instead as in Equation 22b. This 
assumption relates to the argument in (Jaffee and Russell 1997) that the failure of 
catastrophe insurance market lies in the inability of insurance companies to arrange for 
the level of capital necessary to settle extraordinarily large losses.  
, 1 (1 )   ,sy s y syF s y                         (22b) 
In both cases, if the accumulated surplus sy  in year y equals zero or less, we assume 
that the insurer becomes insolvent, and the profit syF  and surplus sy  are set to zero 
for the remaining years ( 1, , )y Y  of the scenario s. 
Insurer Objective function. The objective function is to maximize the average 
annual profit over the full time horizon, averaged over all scenarios S (Expression 23). 
The model thus chooses values of the decision variables A and M defining the 
reinsurance treaty, subject to Constraints (14) to (22). This stochastic optimization 
model, which is both non-linear and non-convex, is solved using an automatic two-
stage Response-Surface and Trust-Region solution procedure in Gao et al. (in 
progress). 
1
max sy
sy
F
SY
                         (23) 
Note that this objective is equivalent to minimizing the total cost ( )j vvC q  to the 
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insurer, since total insurer cost equals the total premiums collected from the 
homeowners as income minus the profit, and the premium income is fixed at the 
specified price level. In other words, the optimal solution to Expression 23, *syF , will 
result in the optimal cost structure * *( ) ( ( ))j v j v vv vC q C D p   for the given price 
levels 
vp  (Eq. 24). 
* *( ) syj v v vv vC q p q F                       (24) 
5. CASE STUDY INPUTS 
Eastern North Carolina was used as a case study area to develop and demonstrate the 
model. The region includes the low-lying coastal part of the state vulnerable to 
hurricane hazard, extending westward to include half of Raleigh, the state capital. A 
tropical storm or hurricane is expected to make landfall on the North Carolina coast on 
average every four years (SCONC 2010). The study focuses on single-family wood-
frame homes, the wind and storm surge flooding hazards (not rainfall-induced 
flooding), and direct losses (structural, non-structural, interior, mechanical, electrical, 
and plumbing, but no contents or additional living expenses). 
The 2010 census tracts are the basic area unit of study, but each of the 143 census 
tracts that touch the coast was divided into three zones—within one mile of the 
coastline; one to two miles from the coastline; and the remainder of the census tract to 
account for zone-specific flood depths within a census tract. The result is 732 
locations i. Eight building categories m were defined to represent all combinations of 
number of stories (one or two), garage (yes or no), and roof shape (hip or gable). Each 
building is defined as a collection of components represented in the damage and loss 
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modeling (e.g., roof covering, openings). Each component in turn is made of many 
component units (e.g., a single window or section of roof covering). For each 
component a few possible physical configurations are defined, each with an associated 
component resistance. The building resistance c of each building is then defined by 
the vector of resistances of its components. The case study includes 192 building 
resistance levels (Peng 2013). 
The component-based loss simulation model is a modified version of the Florida 
Public Hurricane Loss Model for the wind-related damage (FPHLM 2005); and 
Taggart and van de Lindt (2009) and van de Lindt and Taggart (2009) for the flood-
related damage. Described in detail in Peng et al. (2013), and Peng (2013), the loss 
model was used to compute the loss h
imcvL  to a building in location i of building type 
m  and resistance level c in risk region v given hurricane h. The building inventory 
data ( )imcvX  was estimated using census data, with total building counts allocated 
among the building resistance levels c based on location (coastal or not) and year built 
relative to major building code and construction practice changes.  
We define two risk regions v—within two miles of the coast (higher risk H) or not 
(lower risk L). The mean risk aversion parameter values 
v  used in the homeowner 
utility model were estimated using National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) data 
(Gao 2014). Specifically, values of 
v  were chosen so that given our assumed utility 
model, they would result in the penetration rates reported in Dixon et al. (2006). The 
parameter values are 53.0(10 )H
  and 51.7246(10 )L
  for the higher and lower 
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risk areas, respectively. 
We identified the set of 97 probabilistic hurricane scenarios h developed in 
Apivatanagul et al. (2011) using the Optimization-based Probabilistic Scenario 
method. For each hurricane scenario, open terrain three-second peak gust wind speeds 
and surge depths were computed throughout the study region using the storm surge 
and tidal model ADCIRC (Westerink et al. 2008). This set of hurricanes was shown to 
result in errors small enough to be inconsequential for regional loss estimation. Using 
those hurricanes, we developed a set of 2000S   thirty-year scenarios that represent 
the full set of possible scenarios with minimal error (Peng 2013). There are twenty 
time steps per year and 600T   time steps per thirty-year scenario s.  
Other input parameter values include deductible $5000d  , minimum premium 
required $100  , and homeowner insurance budgets of 5%Hk   and 2.5%Lk   
of building value for high and low risk homeowners, respectively. We also assumed 
primary insurer administrative loading factor 0.35   (personal communication, 
John Aquino, WillisRe), factor defining capped surplus 3k  , tax rate for surplus 
retained 0.4  , co-participation factor 95%  , reinsurer loading factor 0.1  , 
and two values of reinsurer risk attitude 0.1g   and 0.5, representing soft and hard 
reinsurance markets, respectively. 
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6. CASE STUDY RESULTS 
6.1 Inverse demand functions and cost function 
Using the inputs in Section 5 and the methods described in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, 
respectively, we developed the inverse demand functions and cost function required 
for the case study application of the Cournot-Nash model. For each risk region v, we 
compute these functions for the range of price (per dollar of coverage) levels from 
$1.35 to $5.35 with a step size of $0.001 for the demand function and $0.1 for the cost 
function. The minimum value of $1.35 assumes the price just covers the transaction 
costs for the insurer ($0.35 per dollar coverage), and therefore approximates the price 
at which the insurer makes zero profit. At $5.35 less than 10% of homeowners in both 
regions are willing to purchase insurance. 
The approximated inverse demand curves are shown in Figure 1.3 (based on the 
calibrated parameter values of the homeowner model in Section 5), where the low risk 
insurance demand is obviously less sensitive to price than high risk. The main reason 
lies in our calibrated risk attitude parameters for the homeowner model (based on 
NFIP data), which suggests that homeowners in low risk region are less risk-averse 
than those in low risk region  ( )L H  , and thus have inelastic insurance demand. 
Through nonlinear regression, we create polynomial estimates of the inverse demand 
curves (Eq. 24), each with an adjusted 2 0.9R  . 
33 4 24 3 16 2 7( ) 2.945(10 ) 2.59(10 ) 8.406(10 ) 1.249(10 ) 9.287H Hj Hj Hj Hj HjP q q q q q
       
(24a)                                 
15 2 7( ) 6.309(10 ) 5.814(10 ) 14.68L Lj Lj LjP q q q
                       (24b) 
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Figure 1.3 Inverse demand curves 
Evaluating the insurer cost ( )j vjvC q  at each of the 1600 price level combinations 
(400 for 
Hp  x 400 for Lp ), we can plot the cost function as a surface. We create 
cost functions for three separate cases: (1) capped surplus in a soft reinsurance market 
(i.e., using Eq. 22a, 0.1g  ), (2) capped surplus in a hard reinsurance market (i.e., 
using Eq. 22a, 0.5g  ), and (3) retain taxed surplus in a hard reinsurance market (i.e., 
using Eq. 22b, 0.5g  ). Figure 4 shows the cost function for Case 1, with the capped 
surplus in a soft reinsurance market. The cost functions for Cases 2 and 3 look similar, 
with vectors of coefficients 7 9 92.272(10 ),2.24,2.533, 1.165(10 ), 8.03(10 )      and 
7 9 91.966(10 ),2.197,2.541, 1.087(10 ), 7.459(10 )      , respectively (Gao 2013). 
Similarly, we used a polynomial form to approximate the resultant cost surface, with 
an adjusted 2 0.9R   (Eq. 25). 
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7 9 2 8( , ) 1.087(10 ) 2.598 3.133 1.779(10 ) 1.339(10 )Hj Lj Hj Lj Hj Hj LjC q q q q q q q
       (25) 
Note that the cross partial derivative of cost to insured loss in high and low risk area 
equals a negative constant 81.339(10 ) , which implies that there is some cost 
complementarity between the two distinct markets. This stems from the fact that a 
firm can spread its reinsurance cost across both markets which makes it more 
profitable to serve both markets as opposed to two separate firms (with separate cost 
functions) serving each market individually. 
Figure 1.4 illustrates the costs move more sharply with coverage in the high risk 
region. That is, for a fixed level of coverage in the high risk region, the insurer’s total 
cost remains at a similar level (shaded color) as the coverage in the low risk area 
increases. However, the converse is not true. For a fixed level of coverage in the low 
risk region, cost escalates quickly as coverage in the high risk area rises.  
 
Figure 1.4 Approximated optimal cost surface for insurer with capped surplus and soft 
reinsurance market 
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6.2 Cournot-Nash model results 
With the fitted inverse demand functions and cost function (Section 6.1), we apply the 
Cournot-Nash model as described in Section 3 (Eq. 1 to 5), by solving the first order 
conditions (Eq. 4 and 5). Since the fitted inverse demand and cost functions are in 
polynomial form, the first order conditions are a system of polynomial equations with 
two variables. We solve these equations using MATLAB version 7.12.0.635 (2012a) 
for a specified number of insurers n. Since the highest order polynomial is four, there 
are at most, four solutions that satisfy the first order conditions. From that set we 
select the solution that results in the highest profit per insurer. Finally, denote the 
optimal coverage for a single insurer (1,2, , )j n , as 
* *( , )Hj Ljq q . We then obtain the 
optimal price per unit coverage for each region by substituting the coverage into the 
inverse demand functions: 
* * * *( ), ( )H H Hj L L Ljp P nq p P nq  . 
We check the stability of the Cournot-Nash model by computing the norm of the 
partial derivative matrix (Eq. 5). More specifically, we calculate the one-norm of the 
partial derivative matrix for each solution for a given number of insurers. The results 
suggest that our Cournot-Nash solutions from monopoly to oligopoly (for 
1,2, ,10n  ) all satisfy the sufficiency condition for (Cournot-Nash equilibrium) 
stability, i.e. 
' * *
1
( , ) 1H LT Q Q  , where 
* * * * * *
1 1( , , ), ( , , )H H Hn L L LnQ q q Q q q  . 
The Cournot-Nash model results provide the key trends across these equilibrium 
solutions as the market structure changes from monopoly ( 1n  ) to less and less 
concentrated oligopoly ( 2 10n  ), (i.e., as insurer competition increases). In 
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Sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.3, respectively, we present the following as functions of the 
number of insurers in the market: (1) equilibrium price (per dollar of coverage) and 
insurance penetration (i.e., insured loss divided by total loss), (2) insurer’s 
performance in terms of profit, return on equity, and insolvency, and (3) reinsurance 
decisions. For each section, we present results for the three cases: (1) capped surplus 
in a soft reinsurance market, (2) capped surplus in a hard reinsurance market, and (3) 
retain taxed surplus in a hard reinsurance market. In the first case, we examine the 
market performance under the situation that insurers do not hold extra catastrophe 
reserve but can more easily transfer risk to the reinsurance market, while in the second 
case the price for reinsurance is higher making it more difficult to transfer risk to the 
reinsurance market. In the last case, while the reinsurance market remains expensive, 
the primary insurers are assumed to keep a portion of the annual surplus as a 
catastrophe reserve to cover future loss.   
6.2.1 Equilibrium price and insurance penetration 
Figure 1.5a illustrates the price per dollar of coverage 
Hp  under all three cases in the 
high risk region. As the number of insurers increases, the price they are able to charge 
declines quickly. At five primary insurers, the price stabilizes at 116%, 95% and 82% 
above the fair price of $1.35, for the capped-soft market (case 1), capped-hard market 
(case 2), and retain-hard market (case 3) cases, respectively. The stabilization of 
equilibrium prices above the fair price ensures the profitability for oligopolies, and 
also implies an imperfect competitive outcome from the game. 
Figure 1.5b gives the price per dollar coverage in the low risk region as a function of 
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the number of primary insurers. Due to the cost complementarity between the distinct 
insurance markets/risk regions (Section 6.1), an insurer could cross subsidize its 
business in low risk region with its business in high risk region, which enables the 
insurer(s) to offer coverage with a unit price lower than the fair price. It is interesting 
to notice that the decline in price as the number of insurance carriers increase is less 
dramatic for the low risk region than the high risk region. For Case 1, for example, in 
the low risk area, the price decreases 25% from $1.20 to $0.90 as we move from one 
to ten insurers. In the high risk area, the same change is 42%, from $5.00 to $2.90. 
 
Figure 1.5 Equilibrium price per dollar coverage vs. number of insurers, for (a) high 
risk region and (b) low risk region, for the three cases 
As competition drives down the price in the high risk areas, the total insured loss and 
insurance penetration increase until the insurance penetration is 35% when there are 
ten primary insurers in the retain-hard market case (Fig. 1.6a). Comparing the three 
cases suggests that the insurance penetration is higher in the hard reinsurance market, 
and in the presence of policies that encourage establishment of larger reserves by the 
 33 
primary insurers (i.e., allowing them to retain profit as in Case 3). This makes sense 
because the price is lower in those cases (Fig. 1.5). In the low risk area, there are more 
modest increases in insurance penetration (Fig. 1.6b) as the number of insurers grows 
because the impact of competition on pricing is more modest than in the high risk 
region. Note that the penetration is higher for the low risk area than the high risk area 
because the total loss is smaller in the former, and penetration is defined as insured 
divided by total loss.  
 
Figure 1.6 Insurance penetration and total expected annual insured loss vs. number of 
insurers, for (a) high risk region and (b) low risk region, for the three cases 
6.2.2 Insurer’s performance 
We can also examine how each insurer’s performance changes with the number of 
insurers in the market. Here we measure an insurer’s performance using three metrics: 
(1) average annual profit, (2) average annual return on equity, and (3) average annual 
probability of insolvency. Average annual profit is as given in Equation 20. Return on 
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equity (ROE) measures profitability by showing how efficiently capital is being used. 
Investors seek a high and stable return on equity, which is defined here as the annual 
net profit divided by the average surplus between the beginning and end of the year. 
Here we compute the average annual ROE, denoted as R, for the years   that the 
insurer is solvent (Eq. 26). To calculate the annual probability of insolvency  , we 
define s  to be a binary indicator variable that is one if the insurer becomes 
insolvent at any time in scenario s and zero otherwise, and take the average over all 
scenarios s (Eq. 27). 
, 1
1
0.5( )
sy
s y sys y
F
R
S   


                    (26) 
1 s
sSY
                            (27) 
Figure 7a shows the single insurer’s average annual profit as a function of the number 
of primary insurers. As expected, profit declines quickly as the number of competitors 
increases. Despite the difference in the penetration of insurance for the three cases in 
the high risk area, the average annual profits among them have only minor differences 
(10%). 
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Figure 1.7 Average annual net profit vs. number of insurers (a) for the three cases, and 
(b) for the Cournot-Nash and Joint Profit Maximization (JPM) solutions for Case 1 
Figure 1.7b gives a comparison of the average annual profit for a capped-soft market 
(Case 1) under Cournot-Nash competition to that under the joint profit maximization 
(JPM), which assumes all insurers form a cartel and cooperate. The joint profit 
maximization is obtained by using the monopoly solution (profit level) divided by the 
number of insurers. The JPM and the single shot Cournot outcome form the support of 
the set of possible outcomes to the infinitely repeated game.  Given the similarity of 
the outcomes between the JPM and Cournot-Nash game, even under a repeated game 
with discount rates that support tacit collusion (i.e., JPM), the profitability does not 
diverge substantively from the single shot Cournot-Nash solution.  
Figure 1.8a shows how average annual return on equity (ROE) changes with market 
competition. Comparing the capped-hard market and retain-hard market cases (Cases 
2 and 3) suggests that the ROE is higher for an insurer with a capped surplus than one 
retaining after-tax profits, because the surplus (and therefore, ROE denominator) is 
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smaller in the former case. This case also reflects the fact that the insurer is retaining 
more risk. As illustrated in Figure 1.8b, the annual probability of insolvency is 
substantially higher (more than 50%) with the capped surplus (Case 2) than without 
(Case 3), all else being equal. Comparing the soft and hard reinsurance markets with 
capped surplus (Cases 1 and 2) in Figure 8b suggests that the probability of insolvency 
is higher when it is more difficult to buy reinsurance (Case 2). Even when reinsurance 
is available in the soft market (Case 1), when more insurers enter the market 
(especially at more than five insurers), it becomes more expensive relative to their 
profits, and thus insurers buy less of it and their probability of insolvency increases. 
Figure 1.8 (a) Average annual return on equity and (b) annual insolvency rate vs. 
number of insurers, for the three cases 
6.2.3 Reinsurance decisions 
As the number of insurers in the market changes, the use of reinsurance changes as 
well. To first understand how the reinsurance is used, we can compare the three cases. 
When the reinsurance market is soft, insurers are assumed not to keep an additional 
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surplus of funds; hence they rely on reinsurance to avoid insolvency. By transferring 
risk, primary insurers obtain a better loss profile. Figure 9 illustrates the cumulative 
density function (CDF) of the net liability of a single primary insurer for the high risk 
region when the market includes five primary insurers, where net liability refers to the 
net loss the primary insurer is liable for after deductible and reinsurance payments are 
received (Fig. 1.2). Among the three cases, the expenditures are lower in a soft 
reinsurance market (i.e., Case 1). By contrast, more of the risk is retained by the 
primary insurer under a hard reinsurance market (with or without capped surplus, i.e., 
Case 2 and Case 3) (Fig. 1.9). Of course this benefit comes at a cost—the reinsurance 
expenses are substantially higher (Fig. 1.10). Figure 1.10 shows how the average 
annual expenditures for reinsurance, including base and reinstatement premiums, 
changes with competition. An insurer’s dependence on reinsurance is dramatically 
reduced when reinsurance is more expensive (i.e., in a hard market, Cases 2 and 3) 
and/or under intense competitive pressures (i.e., when there are more insurers in a soft 
market, Case 1). 
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Figure 1.9 Cumulative density function of net liability of a single primary insurer, for 
high risk region, when n=5 (oligopoly) 
 
Figure 1.10 Single insurer’s annual base reinsurance premium vs. number of insurers, 
for three cases 
Figure 1.11 shows the CDF of the reinsurer’s liability under different market 
configurations (monopoly and oligopoly). As more insurers join the market, the 
loss/risk from the entire primary insurance market that is transferred to the reinsurer 
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increases as well. 
 
Figure 1.11 Cumulative density function of catastrophe loss transferred to the 
reinsurance market for three primary insurance market sizes (n=1, 3, 5) (Case 1) 
Finally, Figure 1.12 gives the ratio of single insurer’s average annual surplus to 
expected insured loss for three cases. As the number of insurers increases, though the 
total expected insured losses in both regions are increasing (Fig. 1.6a and 1.6b), the 
surplus held by the insurer relative to the expected insured loss declines. This simply 
reflects the decline in the (relative) profitability as a result of competition. 
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Figure 1.12 Ratio of a single insurer’s annual surplus to expected insured loss vs. 
number of insurers, for the three cases 
7. SUMMARY 
In this study, we integrated a Cournot-Nash equilibrium framework with individual 
optimization models for key stakeholders (homeowners and insurers), and a loss 
estimation model. These tools were applied to a full-scale case study for hurricane risk 
(flood-wind combined) to residential buildings in Eastern North Carolina. We 
examined the impact of competition in this voluntary catastrophe insurance market by 
investigating the market equilibrium price and insurance penetration; insurer’s 
performance in terms of profit, return on equity, and insolvency; as well as its 
decisions in mitigating financial risk through either reinsurance or self-insurance using 
cash reserves (retained surplus). 
The results from our study indicate that the level of concentration in the primary 
insurance market can lead to significant differences in the operational decisions for an 
individual insurance firm. Choices on reinsurance and the magnitude of retained 
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surpluses and therefore resultant insolvency rates can change dramatically with 
changes in the number of firms competing in the market. There clearly exists a balance 
between the penetration rate of insurance and the insurers’ profitability/solvency. Less 
market concentration makes it harder for primary insurers to maintain profitability and 
avoid insolvency, but benefits the homeowners, as the competition drives down the 
price. Especially for insurers without reserves, competition results in increasing risks 
to be transferred to the reinsurers, which is difficult if reinsurance prices are high. This 
is further justification of (existing) reserve requirements. Overall, these findings 
provide useful information for regulators to make public policy decisions which 
balance insurer profitability and solvency against insurance penetration. There are 
opportunities for further work in at least four areas.  The first area would include the 
extension of the modeling structure to include more of the dynamics in the evolution 
of the building infrastructure over time. For example, building stock is not constant.  
Coastal populations are growing, and with that growth comes renewal in the building 
stock and the creation of new building stock. This impacts the spatial pattern and 
distribution of the losses.  The second area would include exploration of different 
regulatory policies and the introduction of game theoretic treatment of the reinsurance 
market. The third area is the inclusion of new models of homeowner demand. This 
paper focused on a utility maximizing model for homeowner decision-making. This 
modeling could be extended to integrate more ideas from behavioral economics and 
cognitive psychology. The fourth area would be to relax the assumption that 
homeowners have complete information about the vulnerability of their losses. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MODELING GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS IN A NATURAL 
CATASTROPHE INSURANCE MARKET 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED LITERATURES 
It has been argued that the natural disaster insurance market in the United States has 
been stumbling for decades (Grace et al. 2003; Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2009). 
Private insurers face significant insolvency risks with the result that some have failed 
or simply withdrawn from the market in the past few years (Mills et al. 2001; 
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2009; Charpentier and Maux 2010).  
The fundamental source of stress in the private insurance market is the lack of capital 
to finance the highly non-smooth nature of the losses (Jaffee and Russell 1997). 
Furthermore, tax laws and accounting principles discourage U.S. property and casualty 
insurers from accumulating funds specifically to cover these large losses should they 
occur, albeit with low a probability of occurrence (Jaffee and Russell 1997; Cleary and 
Boutchee 2002). The tax disadvantage of equity financing together with the non-tax 
costs of capital have limited the scope of the catastrophe insurance and reinsurance 
market (Harrington and Niehaus 2003), which partially motivates the proposal from 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) to facilitate pre-event 
tax-deferred catastrophe reserves (adopted by several countries, such as Australia, 
Barbados, Canada, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom) – a proposal that has been advocated by the American insurance industry 
for at least a decade (Cleary and Boutchee 2002).  
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These capital challenges do not necessarily imply that these risks cannot be insured 
(Jaffee and Russell 1997). If the risks can be more easily priced into premiums so as to 
yield a reasonable profit margin for insurers and those insurers have fewer barriers to 
raising capital when needed, several authors have speculated that the private 
catastrophe loss insurance market would become significantly more viable (Cummins 
2006; Jaffee and Russell 2006). Rather than focusing on facilitating the private 
insurance market, the U.S. government has focused on ensuring an “affordable” price 
for insurance, coupled with federally funded programs to supplement or substitute for 
private natural catastrophe loss insurance. The implementation of these programs has 
likely created market distortions that decrease the incentives for private entities to 
enter the market effectively  undermining the private market’s ability to effectively 
manage catastrophe risk (Klein 1998; Grace et al. 2003; Cummins 2006; Kunreuther 
and Michel-Kerjan 2009; Charpentier and Maux 2011). Though government funded 
insurance programs (which could be considered as the residual market), seemed 
successful at first, they ultimately accumulated large deficits (e.g., the National Flood 
Insurance Program) and require substantial public funding to continue operations (US 
GAO 2007).  
These problems have made it necessary to reexamine government’s role in the natural 
catastrophe insurance market, with the goal of identifying government policies  that 
facilitate, rather than replace, the more efficient private market solutions (Jaffee and 
Russell 1997; Cummins 2006; Charpentier and Maux 2011). The policy options that 
affect private insurance markets include regulation/deregulation (i.e., premiums, 
financial requirements and barriers to entry and exit), mitigation initiatives, insurance 
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price supports, property acquisition as well as the abovementioned tax-favored 
catastrophe reserve policy.  
This paper investigates the impacts of government interventions, which are designed 
to reduce uninsured losses by facilitating the private insurance market with minimal 
regulatory intervention in the competitive mechanism. On the demand side, the effects 
of price support and acquisition programs are explored. On the supply side, the 
impacts of pre-event tax-favored catastrophe reserves are considered. These 
interventions are integrated into the modeling of an unaided catastrophe insurance 
market with explicit representation of the key stakeholders (homeowners, primary 
insurers and reinsurers) given in Gao et al. (2013). This framework uses a one shot 
Cournot-Nash noncooperative game structure to model the market.  
The next section summarizes the modeling framework. The third section develops a 
case study based on residential buildings in North Carolina. The fourth section 
presents conclusions. 
2. MODELING FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Overview of interacting models 
This paper utilizes a Stackelberg framework to represent the government’s interaction 
with the stakeholders in the insurance market, where the government functions as the 
Stackelberg leader by creating the regulations which govern the interactions between 
the primary insurers, and homeowners.  Figure 2.1 gives an overview of the 
modeling framework and component models. In this framework, the government 
decides whether to offer price supports to homeowners and the magnitude of those 
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supports, as well as whether or not to acquire homes that are particularly vulnerable. 
Both of these decisions affect the demand for insurance.  
 
Figure 2.1 Structure of interacting models 
Following the framework, individual insurance decisions on the demand side are 
captured by a utility maximization model with a homeowner budget constraint. This 
utility model considers homeowner heterogeneity with respect to risk attitude.  On 
the supply side, each primary insurer is assumed to maximize their expected net profit 
through a stochastic optimization model, to conclude how much risk to transfer to the 
reinsurer (we assume one layer of catastrophe risk excess of loss reinsurance for 
simplicity) at any price and demand level (Gao et al. 2013). These elements support 
the estimation of cost and demand functions which specify the Cournot-Nash model. 
A state-of-the-art regional catastrophe loss estimation model is used to estimate 
homeowner losses to a range of events that represent the regional hurricane hazard 
(Peng et al. 2013). These events are used to estimate the hazard each homeowner 
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faces.  We assume that this information is available to both primary insurers and 
homeowners. Primary insurers use this information to establish premiums while 
homeowners use it to make insurance purchase decisions. As stated previously, the 
government intervenes in the interactions between insurers and homeowners through 
premium price supports and acquisition decisions, which affects insurance demand 
and therefore affects the cost structure of the primary insurers.   
2.2 Estimating reaction functions 
These interacting models are used to estimate reaction functions by varying their 
inputs and computing their outputs (i.e., optimization result from each model) as the 
response. More specifically, denote price per unit coverage charged by an insurer in 
risk region v as 
vp , the homeowner, government and loss models together are used to 
derive the insurance demand (in terms of expected coverage) 
vQ  by region.  
We assume that the government supports a portion of the homeowners that cannot 
afford the premium, subject to a budget constraint on total pre-event government 
outlays. Therefore, the government aided homeowners’ premium will be reduced to 
their budget level, and they will make the insurance purchase decision based on the 
subsidized premium they face. However, if purchasing the insurance at the subsidized 
price does not maximize their expected utility; those homeowners would not purchase 
insurance. On the other hand, for the homeowners for whom the premium does not 
exceed their estimated financial resources, they purchase insurance if it maximizes 
their expected utility. 
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Denote the total expected insurance coverage 
vQ  from all homeowners (aided and 
unaided) in region v, at price level 
vQ , as ( )v v vQ D p , which includes the units of 
coverage (per dollar of expected loss) fully funded by the homeowner and subsidized 
by the government. The relationship between 
vQ  and vp  (demand function 
( )v v vQ D p  or its inverse 
1( ) ( )v v v v vp D Q P Q
  , at specific price levels are 
identified by employing the homeowner model repeatedly at those price levels. 
Regression is used to establish the continuous form of this relationship. 
Similarly, the insurer model interacting with the homeowner, government and 
reinsurer models are used to develop the cost function. At price level 
vp , and 
corresponding insurance demand level ( )v v vQ D p , the insurer’s optimal cost of 
doing business in all risk regions v, results from the stochastic optimization model and 
is denoted as ( )vvC Q . The key decision the insurer makes using this model is 
whether to purchase reinsurance; and if so, what is the attachment point and maximum 
payout. These decisions yield the maximum profit level given the price and 
homeowner reaction to that price (i.e. demand).  
This method of transforming these individual optimization models into (reaction) 
functions has been applied in (Gao et al. 2013), which focuses solely on the private 
natural catastrophe insurance market (without government interventions) with the 
same homeowners, insurers and loss model as described in Figure 2.1.  
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2.3 Cournot-Nash model 
Both the inverse demand functions ( )v vP Q  and cost function ( )vvC Q  derived as 
described above become the input functions in the static Cournot-Nash 
noncooperation game theoretic model, which captures the strategic interaction of the 
noncooperative primary insurers We assume perfect information is available to all 
parties and insurers are homogeneous, i.e., each insurer faces the same basic cost 
structure, and is equally capable of handling all levels of demand. In the static 
noncooperative game, each insurer forms a best-response strategy that maximizes net 
profit recognizing the best-response strategies of its competitors. All insurers in the 
market make their decisions simultaneously. For simplicity, we assume that insurers 
always offer full coverage.  As in a Cournot game, we assume that the competition is 
on the quantity of insurance sold at the market equilibrium price.  Each property 
owner, at most, only purchases one insurance contract from a single insurer. 
Furthermore, by symmetry, total sales at the equilibrium price will be divided evenly 
geographically and with respect the vulnerability of the building inventory, which will 
result in the same net profit for each insurer.  
More specifically, single insurer j’s decision in the Cournot-Nash game is the total 
coverage offered in risk region v is denoted as  
vjq . This is the annual expected 
insured loss. Their annual net profit can be described as the premiums received by 
insurer j by those they insure minus the cost of providing that insurance on an annual 
basis (Eq. 1). Note that the first term is a function of the coverage provided by all 
insurers vj vj q Q  since that determines the price ( )v vP Q  (i.e., inverse demand 
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function as in Section 2.1), while the second term is a function of only the coverage 
offered by the insurer j, and ( )j vjvC q  refers to the cost function (also described in 
Section 2.1). Expressing the individual insurer’s objective as a function of its 
decisions/strategies and its competitors’ facilitates (as given in Eq. (1)) the derivation 
of the optimization conditions (Eq. 2). 
( , ) ( , ) ( )    0 j vj vj vj v vj vj j vj vjv v v vq Q q P q Q C q q v                (1) 
We assume each insurer is a net profit maximizer and formulate a best response 
function that recognizes the strategic interaction with other insurers. If the problem is 
differentiable, the optimal solution for net profit maximization should satisfy the first 
order conditions (Eq. 2), based on the envelope theorem (Mas-Colell et al. 1995), 
which also refers to the relationship that marginal cost equals to marginal revenue: 
( )( , )
( , ) 0,   
j vjj v vj vj v
v vj vj vj
vj vj vj
C qP q Q
P q Q q v
q q q
 

 
    
  

        (2) 
Denote insurer j’s actions that satisfy the first order conditions (for profit 
maximization) as a vector of reactions (i.e., coverage provided in each region v, or 
best responses) * *( , )j vjx q v  . Since the insurers are all homogeneous, they shall have 
the same optimality conditions and best responses. Thus, by symmetry, insurer j’s 
rivals’ actions (under simultaneous optimization) are:  
* *,k jx x k j   ; 
* *( 1) ,vj k vjk jQ x n q v     . 
By substitution the first order conditions (Eq. 2), they can be rewritten as: 
*
* *
( )( )
( ) 0,   
j vjv vj v
v vj vj
vj vj
C qP nq
P nq q v
q q

   
 

              (3) 
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The solution *
vjq  that satisfies Equation 3 is firm j’s best response to its rivals’ best 
responses, and thus represents the equilibrium condition for this model, i.e., the Nash 
equilibrium solution for the n insurers in the market. The equilibrium price is found 
via the inverse demand function * *( )v v vjp P nq . 
2.4 Government intervention model 
Since the government is assumed to have a fixed 30 year budget for premium support 
and acquisition we use the following procedure to estimate (1) which homeowners get 
premium supports and the magnitude of those supports; and (2) which properties are to 
be acquired and removed from the building inventory.  
For a given premium 
Hp  per dollar of insured loss in the high risk region (H), all 
homes for which the resultant premium would exceed 5% of the value of the home on 
an annual basis, which is assumed to approximate the homeowner’s budget for 
insurance, are identified. Those homes are then ranked in decreasing order by their 
benefit to cost ratios. The benefit is assumed to be the expected average annual 
homeowner losses avoided if the policy is purchased. The cost is assumed to be the 
annual support required to create a premium payment for the homeowner that is 5% of 
the value of the home annually. The larger this ratio is, the higher the priority on the 
part of the government to provide assistance. The homeowners can only receive the 
support if they are willing to purchase the annual insurance at their maximum budget 
level (i.e., 5% of the value of the home annually), which is estimated using the 
homeowner utility model. In other words, if the selected homeowners are not willing 
to pay up to their budget level for the insurance, they do not receive the subsidy from 
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the government.  If the premium support over 30 years exceeds the value of the 
home, the home is acquired, if that level of benefit to costs falls within the 
government’s budget limit.  
3. CASE STUDY 
This section describes a full-scale, realistic case study for hurricane risk (flood and 
wind combined) for single-family residential buildings in Eastern North Carolina.  
We divide North Carolina into a high risk region H (defined as within 3 miles to the 
coast) and low risk region L (beyond 3 miles to the coast). We only consider homes in 
the high risk region as candidates for the price support and acquisition.   
3.1 Relationship between government funds available and insurance demand 
Figure 2 gives the increased insurance demand ( )H H HQ D p  in the high risk region 
H at price level 
Hp  ranging from $1.35 to $5.37 per dollar coverage, due to 
government premium supports. A risk-based premium approach is adopted in this 
study, and the fair (minimum) premium is assumed to be $1.35 per dollar coverage, 
which is assumed to cover the transaction/administration cost (assumed to be $0.35 
per dollar transaction) and the expected loss (per dollar of expected loss coverage). 
The original unaided insurance demand ( )H HD p , as described in Section 2.2, stems 
from homeowners who are willing to purchase insurance and can afford their 
premium.  The affordability requirement imposed on the model is that the annual 
premium must be less than or equal to 5% of value of the home.  
It should be noted that the insurance demand curves with government subsidies plus 
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acquisitions at different total government budget levels overlap when the prices are 
low (<= $1.7 per dollar coverage), which implies that the demand for insurance are at 
their highest levels, given homeowner risk attitudes. Figure 2.2 also implies that the 
saturated demand is not maintained as the price increases because their risk attitudes 
for many homeowners doesn’t support ever increasing expenditures up to their budget 
levels relative to their exposure. It is useful that with a budget of about $3 Billion, 
there is a more uniform drop in the expected demand as the price increases than for 
other budgets. The source of this difference is that the transition from a more price 
support-centric strategy to a more acquisition centric strategy is somewhat more 
gradual leading a steadier decline in demand.  
 
Figure 2.2 Inverse demand functions for varying levels of government funds available 
As described in Section 2.4, the government intervention not only includes premium 
support, but also acquisition when the expenditure on premium support over 30 years 
would exceed the home value. The impact of the government acquisition program on 
total expected loss is depicted by Figure 2.3 below. At low price levels (<= $1.8 per 
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dollar coverage), almost no acquisition occurs because price supports are cheaper.  
As costs rise, acquisition becomes more desirable. 
 
Figure 2.3 Total expected losses for varying levels of government funds available 
Finally, the combined impacts of government premium support and acquisition 
programs on insured loss are illustrated in Figure 2.4, where the insurance demand rate 
(penetration) is defined as the expected insurance demand divided by total expected 
loss from non-acquired buildings. It is important to realize that premium supports 
increases the expected insured loss, while acquisition reduces the total (expected) loss 
(i.e., the denominator). Both of these contribute to increases in the demand rate. With 
a $300 million budget over 30 years, the government can raise the demand rate 
(relative to the unsupported or unaided rate with no price supports or acquisitions) by 
approximately 10% at all price levels. When the budget increases to $1 billion over 30 
years, the increment in the demand rate ranges from 10% to 20% as the price increases 
from $1.36 to $2 per dollar coverage, and it remains at 20% (or more) for higher price 
levels. With $3 billion in government intervention funds, the demand rate is above 
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80% as price increases to $2.9 per dollar coverage, and the increment (comparing to 
original unaided) reaches more than 30% for prices higher than $2.9 per dollar 
coverage. 
Figure 2.4 also illustrates that the insurance demand rate does not reach 100%, 
regardless of government funds available for these programs. In fact, about 28% of 
homeowners with their expected loss accounts to 3% of total loss are not willing to 
pay up to 5% of their home value at the cheapest price level, given the risks their 
homes face and their risk attitudes assumptions. In other words, even if these 
homeowners are offered subsidized premiums that are affordable, they will choose not 
to buy insurance since baring risk results in higher utilities for them than paying for 
insurance. 
 
Figure 2.4 Government interventions’ combined impacts on insurance demand for 
varying levels of government funds available 
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3.2 Inverse demand functions and cost functions for Cournot-Nash model 
For simplicity, we focus on the 30-year budgets totaling $300 million and $1 billion 
for government interventions for the remainder of the analysis. The inverse demand 
functions under the no government intervention and interventions of $300 million and 
$1 billion, which are illustrated in Figure 2.2, were estimated using nonlinear 
regression and are given in Equations (4), (5) and (6), respectively. All polynomial 
functions have adjusted 2R  values that exceed 0.9.  
33 4 24 3 16 2 7( ) 2.291(10 ) 2.181(10 ) 7.596(10 ) 1.187(10 ) 9.13H Hj Hj Hj Hj HjP q q q q q
         
(4) 
41 5 32 4 24 3 15 2
7
( ) 2.044(10 ) 2.144(10 ) 8.826(10 ) 1.802(10 )
               1.893(10 ) 14.68
H Hj Hj Hj Hj Hj
Hj
P q q q q q
q
   

    
 
 (5) 
33 4 24 3 16 2 7( ) 2.945(10 ) 2.59(10 ) 8.406(10 ) 1.249(10 ) 9.287H Hj Hj Hj Hj HjP q q q q q
                    
(6) 
Since government interventions in the low risk region are not considered, the inverse 
demand function in this region is unaffected by these demand-side programs.  The 
inverse demand function in the low risk area is also estimated through nonlinear 
regression and that estimate is given in Equation (7). 
15 2 7( ) 6.309(10 ) 5.814(10 ) 14.68L Lj Lj LjP q q q
                (7) 
To investigate the impacts of catastrophe reserves, we considered two scenarios when 
estimating the cost function: (1) insurers retain 75% of their annual surplus as pre-
event catastrophe reserve, where the 25% of their annual surplus could be considered 
as cost/tax (at a favored tax rate by government) for keeping this reserve; and (2) all 
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insurers are assumed to annually reallocate surpluses greater than their initial 
investment (which is assumed to be 3 times the value of the premiums) by either 
reinvesting in other lines of business (which are never assumed to be used to address 
policyholder losses) or distributing it to investors as dividends.  As mentioned 
previously, the insurer model is fully described in Gao et al. (2013).  
The cost functions with and without special pre-event reserves under the three sets of 
inverse demand functions (stemming from no government intervention, $300 million 
and $1 billion dollar government support programs) are estimated using nonlinear 
regression. All fitted cost functions have adjusted 2R  values that exceed 0.9.   
Figure 2.5 below illustrates the insurer’s cost function when $300 million is available 
in government support and insurers do not maintain reserves in excess of 3 times the 
value of the policies they have written (which is the initial investment).  Equation (8) 
gives the associated regression equation. 
7 9 2( , ) 1.641(10 ) 2.37 2.013 1.887(10 ) 7.162Hj Lj Hj Lj Hj Hj LjC q q q q q q q
          (8) 
These new demand and cost functions are then utilized in the Cournot-Nash (market 
competition) model (Eq. 1 to Eq. 3), as described in Section 2.3, to solve for the 
equilibrium * * * *( , ; , )H Hj L Ljp q p q  under different market structures (from monopoly to 
oligopoly) through varying the number of insurers. 
For ease of discussion, we denote the case of funding government programs with up to 
$300 million and insurers with a capped surplus as “$300M support, capped”; “$300M 
support, retain” denotes $300 million in government funding and insurers that retain a 
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pre-event reserve; “$1B support, capped” denotes up to $1 billion in government 
funding and insurers have a capped surplus; “$1B support, retain” denotes $1 billion 
budget and insurers that retain a pre-event reserve; “No support, capped” denotes 
unaided demand and insurers have a capped surplus; “No support, retain” denotes 
unaided demand and insurers that retain a pre-event reserve. 
 
Figure 2.5 Insurer’s cost function for case “$300M support, capped” 
3.3 Market performance analysis for Cournot-Nash solutions  
To fully understand the impacts of these interventions on market performance, the 
impacts of on all key stakeholders (i.e., homeowners, primary insurers and 
government) are considered.  More specifically, the impacts of government policies 
and market competition are examined by considering: 1) insured and uninsured losses; 
2) each insurer’s profitability (price, net profit and return on equity), insolvency, and 
their decisions for managing risk (hedging or retaining); and 3) the government’s 
 63 
expenditures on price support and acquisition programs and how they affect uninsured 
losses. 
3.3.1 Insured loss and uninsured loss 
Figures 2.6a and 2.6b display the annual expected insured losses and the penetration 
rate in each of the six cases. It is clear that competition and both types of government 
action can reduce uninsured losses.  In the best scenario as defined by the highest 
market penetration for insurance (“$1B support, retain” case in Fig. 2.6a), that rate 
reaches 60% of total losses (double that of the unaided market, “No support, capped” 
case in Fig. 2.6a). 
 
Figure 2.6 (a) Insurance penetration and (b) Expected insured loss vs. number of 
insurers, for the six cases 
In Figure 6a, the penetration rate curve of the “no support, retain” case lies above that 
of the “$300M support, capped” case (especially under oligopolies with more than 2 
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insurers), yet below that of the “$1B support, capped” case, which indicates the 
potential potency of the catastrophe reserve policy to the effects of demand support 
with hundreds of million dollars (between $300 million and $1 billion). Furthermore, 
the curve of “$300M support, retain” partially lies above that of “$1B support, 
capped”, which again implies that significant benefits are possible with a catastrophe 
reserve policy.  It is important to note however, that government actions will be 
needed to make these reserve pools viable to the insurers. This is likely to take the 
form of a tax incentive, which will result a reduction in government revenues. 
As for the uninsured losses, we first examined the trends under government 
interventions (with $300 million and $1 billion budgets) as the market structure 
changes from monopoly to oligopoly (Fig. 2.7 and Fig. 2.8), since both government 
interventions and market competition mechanism reduce uninsured losses. In the 
“$300M support, capped” case, $10 million (3% of total expected loss in high risk 
region) annual expected loss were avoided or supported by insurance by the 
government under different market structures (which is equivalent to the money 
expended via the intervention on an annual basis). But this impact seems less 
influential than that from the market competition mechanism, which reduces the 
annual uninsured losses by $99 million (31% of total expected loss) with 3 insurers 
and $127 million ( 39% of total expected loss) with 10 insurers (Fig. 2.7a). As a result, 
the uninsured losses are reduced from 81% to 58% in terms of total expected loss as 
the market structure changes from monopoly to oligopoly (with 10 insurers). In 
addition to insurance demand support, the catastrophe reserve policy further facilitates 
private market competition and reduces more uninsured losses, as indicated in the case 
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of “$300M support, retain”, where the increase in competition reduces annual 
expected losses by about $117 million (36% of total expected loss) when 3 insurers 
are added, and $158 million (49% of total expected loss), when 10 insurers are added 
in the market (Fig. 2.7b). Due to this more efficient mechanism, the uninsured loss are 
reduced from 81% to 48% (i.e., 10% less than that of “$300M support, capped” case) 
in terms of total expected loss as the market structure changes from monopoly to 
oligopoly (with 10 insurers). 
The $1 billion budget for government’s interventions over 30 years triples the annual 
acquired or supported losses from $10 million to $33 million (3% to 10% of total 
expected loss) as illustrated in Figure 2.8. As competition increases, the uninsured 
losses are reduced from 76% to 53% (of total expected loss) from monopoly to 
oligopoly (with 10 insurers) when retained funds are capped in contrast to from 76% 
to 41% when a reserve is available.  
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Figure 2.7 Government and competition impacts on annual uninsured loss for (a) 
$300M support, capped and (b) $300M support, retain cases 
 
Figure 2.8 Government and competition impacts on uninsured loss for (a) $1B 
support, capped and (b) $1B support, retain cases 
Government interventions and market competition not only reduce the expected 
annual uninsured losses but also improve the risk profile for these expenditures. We 
examined this impact on the uninsured loss distribution as competition rises.  In 
Figures 2.9 and 2.10, we focus on competition with 1 to 5 insurers in the market 
(mostly due to the declining impacts of competition beyond 5 insurers). Notice that as 
competition rises, the tails are reduced on the cumulative density functions (CDF). 
Under both budget levels (i.e., $300 million and $1 billion), the “retain” cases (Fig. 
2.9b and Fig. 2.10b) result in smaller tails than their corresponding “capped” case. 
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Figure 2.9 CDF of uninsured loss for (a) $300M support, capped and (b) $300M 
support, retain cases 
 
Figure 2.10 CDF of uninsured loss for (a) $1B support, capped and (b) $1B support, 
retain cases 
Figure 2.11 gives the CDFs of uninsured losses for all six cases under monopoly and 
oligopoly market structures. Figure 2.11a implies that under monopoly, the uninsured 
loss profile under all government demand support cases (with different budget levels 
and “retain” or “capped” scenarios) are very close and superior to the no support cases 
(which overlapped with each other). Nevertheless, the benefits from government 
interventions and competition on the uninsured loss profile become larger as the 
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market structure changes from monopoly to oligopoly.  This is illustrated by the 
shifts in the CDF curves towards the upper-left corner (Fig. 2.11b). It is also 
interesting to notice that, in Figure 2.11b, the CDF curve of “$300M support, retain” 
lies to the left of that of “$1B support, capped” case. In other words, the $300 million 
demand support with catastrophe reserve policy for insurers is roughly slightly better 
than the $1 billion demand support with capped surplus under and oligopoly market 
structure (with 5 insurers).  
 
Figure 2.11 CDF of uninsured loss for all six cases under (a) Monopoly and (b) 
Oligopoly (n=5) 
3.3.2 Single insurer’s profitability, insolvency and decisions in managing risk 
Both the government intervention and market competition effectively reduce 
equilibrium prices under all scenarios (Fig. 2.12). More specifically, the competition, 
due to the increment of insurers, causes a similar decreasing pattern in price in all six 
cases, from approximately $5.3 per dollar coverage under monopoly to approximately 
$2.5 per dollar coverage under oligopoly (n >= 5). Also, the differences between the 
equilibrium prices across all six cases are modest (< $1 per dollar coverage) as 
indicated in Figure 2.12. Therefore the insurers have similar levels of net profit under 
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the six cases (Fig. 2.13). Hence, in terms of profitability, the benefits from government 
interventions do not appear to flow to the supply side.  
 
Figure 2.12  Government and competition impacts on equilibrium price for the six 
cases 
 
Figure 2.13  Government and competition impacts on net profit for the six cases 
Return on equity (ROE) is another important measurement of the desirability of an 
investment; therefore we focus on a single insurer’s ROE under different market 
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structures (Fig. 2.14). Among the six cases, half involve the catastrophe reserve 
policy, while the others assume that insurers invest their annual surpluses in other 
lines of business or distribute it as dividends. The catastrophe reserve policy reduces 
the ROE for insurers, since the reserve (i.e. more investments) is set aside to cover 
future losses. Since the net profit levels for the cases with or without the catastrophe 
reserve are all very close (Fig. 2.13), it indicates no obvious benefit from the 
catastrophe reserve in increasing profitability. As a result, the ROE for the catastrophe 
reserve cases are lower than when such a large reserve is not present. The stability of 
the ROE under the “retain” cases also implies that neither government interventions 
nor competition has significantly affected the efficiency of insurers’ investment. On 
the other hand, for “capped” cases, the market competition mechanism has caused the 
oscillation of ROE as the market structure changes.  
 
Figure 2.14 Government and competition impact on single insurer’s ROE for the six 
cases 
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Other than profitability, avoiding insolvency is the biggest challenge for insurers in 
this market because of the low-frequency but high-consequence nature of the risk. In 
this study, we focus on excess of loss reinsurance and/or the catastrophe reserves for 
managing these risks. Figure 2.15 gives the insolvency rates across the 6 cases 
whereas Figure 2.16 indicates how excess of loss reinsurance is used.  For all 
“capped” cases, insurers rely mostly on reinsurance to transfer risk and avoid 
insolvency; while for the “retain” case, insurers utilize their catastrophe reserves as 
well as reinsurance to manage risk and avoid insolvency. 
As indicated in Figure 2.15, the annual insolvency rates under all “retain” cases are 
similar and monotonic as more insurers join in the market, which relates to the impacts 
of competition. The similarity between the “retain” cases implies no obvious impact of 
government interventions on insurers’ insolvency, since the catastrophe reserve 
enables insurers to efficiently manage their risk. On the other hand, for all “capped” 
cases, the market competition also results in an increasing (but not monotonic) 
insolvency trend; and the insolvency rates do not stabilize across the number of 
insurers. However, with no more than five insurers in the market, the insolvency rates 
for “capped” cases are generally smaller those for the “retain” cases. Even though, this 
advantage is not maintained with more than five insurers. Figure 2.15 also implies that 
the “capped” cases have more variable insolvency rates than the “retain” cases, which 
seem smoother as insurer number increases. Since the net profit levels for “capped” 
and “retained” cases under different number of insures are very similar (Fig. 2.13), the 
different insolvency patterns reflect that the optimization under “retain” cases (i.e. 
with catastrophe reserve) is more stable than that under the “capped” cases. In other 
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words, under the same profitable level, it’s harder to avoid/control insolvency with 
capped surplus than retained surplus. 
 
Figure 2.15 Government and competition impacts on single insurer’s insolvency rate 
for the six cases 
Figure 2.16 compares the insurers’ annual reinsurance payments to total expected 
insured loss rates for the six cases, which roughly represents the portion of risk 
transferred to the reinsurer. More specifically, denote the annual expected loss 
transferred to the reinsurer (from insurer) as  , the corresponding reinsurance 
premium denoted as b is given in Equation (9) below 
(1 )L g                              (9) 
where   refers to the loading factor of the insurer which is assumed to be 0.1 in this 
study (Gao et al. 2013, Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2009).  The first term is the 
burdened expected loss while the second term refers to the standard deviation   of 
loss L scaled by a user-specified constant g , which reflects reinsurer’s risk aversion 
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attitude. A higher value of g  would result in a higher reinsurance premium which 
make it harder for primary insurers to transfer their risk to reinsurer. A high value of 
g  denotes a “hard” reinsurance market; on the other hand, a low value of g  drives 
down the reinsurance premium and results in a “soft” market (Kunreuther and Michel-
Kerjan 2009). In this study we assume a “soft” reinsurance market by setting 0.1g  , 
and the resulted annual reinsurance premium are close to that under fair price level 
(i.e., 0, 0g   ).  
Insurers choose self-insurance over reinsurance under all “retain” cases. As a result, 
the risk is mostly retained by the primary insurer. By contrast, for all “capped” cases, 
more than 50% of the risk among all insurers is transferred to the reinsurer under 
different market structures (from monopoly to oligopoly (n <= 10)) and different 
levels of government intervention budget. However, as more insurers join the market 
and price competition increases less reinsurance is purchased because of declining 
revenues against rising costs. 
 
Figure 2.16. Government and competition impacts on single insurer’s reinsurance 
decisions for the six cases 
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3.3.3 Government’s expenditure on price support and acquisition programs 
and their efficiency 
Figures 2.17a to 2.17d give the allocation of the government’s total budget (either 
$300 million or $1 billion), under the capped or retain cases, between price support 
and acquisition programs at equilibrium price levels under different market structures 
(from monopoly to oligopoly). As competition drives down the equilibrium price, the 
government’s expenditures increase on price supports but decreases on acquisitions 
(Fig. 2.17b, 2.17c and 2.17d). The one exception is “$300M support, capped”, for 
which competition does not drive the price of insurance sufficiently low so all $300 
million is spent on acquisition (Fig. 2.17a).  Further, Figure 2.17a implies that under 
monopoly competition all funds are spent on acquisition regardless of government 
programs and whether or not a reserve fund is created.  This is because under 
monopoly conditions, the equilibrium prices remain relatively high (Fig. 2.12).  
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Figure 2.17 Government’s expenditure under market equilibrium on price support and 
acquisition for (a) $300M support, capped, (b) $300M support, retain, (c) $1B support, 
capped and (d) $1B support, retain cases 
Figure 2.18 gives the CDFs of the losses avoided on the properties that are acquired 
when there is a monopoly. These CDFs indicate that it is possible to avoid uninsured 
losses of up to $5 billion over 30 years with a $300 million investment over this 
period, while the $1 billion budget enables the avoidance of uninsured losses on these 
properties that can rise to about $20 billion dollars.   
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Figure 2.18. CDF of acquired losses by government – Monopoly 
Figures 2.19a and 2.19b give the CDFs for these avoided losses when the market is 
composed of 10 primary insurers.  When there are 10 primary insurers there is a mix 
of price subsidies and acquisition with relatively more money spent on price supports 
when funds are retained in contrast when these funds are capped at the level of the 
initial investment.  It is important to compare the scales of Figures 2.18 and 2.19. The 
potential exists to avoid substantially more losses under market competition because 
the equilibrium prices are lower so the dollars the government makes available in 
these programs “go farther”. 
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Figure 2.19 CDF of (a) acquired and (b) price supported loss by government under 
Oligopoly (n=10), for three cases 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In conclusion, our results suggests that acquisition, price supports and policies to 
encourage insurers to create catastrophe reserves do lead to improvements in market 
performance and a substantial reduction in uninsured losses.  For example, under 
these policies the penetration rate for insurance rises from about 15% to anywhere 
from 20% to close to 50% under monopoly conditions and from about 30% to about 
60% when there are 10 primary insurers in the market. Also, based on our results, the 
implementation of a catastrophe reserve policy enhances market competition and has a 
greater impact in reducing uninsured loss than many dollars’ worth of subsidization or 
acquisition by government. 
Further, our results also indicate the benefits of these programs are generally do not 
get passed onto the insurers in the form of higher net profits but rather remain with the 
homeowners and the government as a substantial reductions in uninsured losses. 
Finally, this study highlights the importance of competition in this market. With a 
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single primary insurer, prices remain relatively high surprising homeowner demand 
for insurance and greatly reducing the impacts of government programs. Hence 
governmental actions are likely to have a “multiplier” effect. That is, actions to 
address inherent market shortcomings will stimulate competition and that competition 
will make it easier to address the weaknesses. 
There are many avenues for future research.  Our analysis is based on a simplified 
framework of the natural catastrophe insurance market, which does not consider 
imperfect information, heterogeneity between insurers, competition dynamics as well 
as complicated insurance regulations. In reality, all of these issues are likely to have 
effects on the performance of the catastrophe insurance market as well as the 
government interventions examined in this study.  
Also, it is critical to continue to refine the data. Modeling in this domain is very data 
intensive.  Perhaps the place where that need is the highest is that which would 
provide more insight into consumer preferences. 
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CHAPTER 3 
APPLICATION OF RESPONSE-SURFACE AND TRUST-REGION METHOD IN 
THE OPTIMIZATION OF A NATURAL CATASTROPHE INSRUANCE MARKET 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Response–Surface methodology and Trust–Region methods have been 
extensively applied in many branches of engineering, but not frequently utilized in 
economic analysis. This paper presents an application of the combination of these two 
methods – an automatic Response-Surface Trust-Region method to the constrained 
simulation optimization of a primary insurer in a natural catastrophe insurance market. 
The optimization problem involves a utility-based homeowner decision model, a 
constrained stochastic optimization model to represent the insurer’s decisions, as well 
as a state-of-the-art regional catastrophe loss estimation model. This automatic 
algorithm was utilized to solve for the equilibrium supply-demand relationship. The 
models and algorithm were applied to a full-scale case study for hurricane risk to 
residential buildings in Eastern North Carolina. In comparison with Simulated 
Annealing, for this problem, the algorithm is shown to be computationally efficient 
yielding an improved solution more quickly. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Response Surface Methodology (RSM) is a collection of statistical and mathematical 
techniques, (including design of experiments and regression analysis), for the 
optimization of stochastic functions (Box and Wilson 1951). The fundamental strategy 
is to sequentially approximate the stochastic ‘input-output’ relationship of a simulation 
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model in order to optimize the inputs using experimental design and response surface 
optimization. The concepts and techniques of RSM have been extensively applied in 
many branches of engineering, especially in the chemical and manufacturing areas 
(Box et al. 1978). RSM has also become one of the most popular heuristics for 
simulation optimization over the past three decades (Neddermeijer et al. 2000; Myers 
and Montgomery 2002; Kleijnen 2008). However, the major disadvantages of RSM 
are the lack of a convergence guarantee and the non-automatic (with human inputs 
required at each step) nature of the algorithm.   
On the other hand, Trust-Region (TR) methods (Conn et al. 1987) are a class of 
relatively new algorithms for nonlinear deterministic optimization, with automatic and 
local convergence properties, and are also  local approximation-based. Though RSM 
and TR both generate steps based on a local approximation model, they do this in 
different ways. RSM uses a local model (linear or quadratic) to generate a search 
direction first and then relies on the user to determine a suitable step length along this 
direction, while TR defines a “trust region” around the current solution and uses an 
efficient (quadratic) program to solve for the search direction and step length 
simultaneously. The trust region is adjusted (automatically) from iteration to iteration 
based on the assessed quality of the local approximation model. Over the past decade, 
TR has proven to be effective and robust for solving unconstrained/constrained 
nonlinear optimization problems (e.g., Sadjadi and Ponnambalam 1999; Zhang 2006; 
Shi and Guo 2008), though its application in stochastic/simulation optimization is 
somewhat rare.  
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Recently, the combination of RSM and TR has been proposed for unconstrained 
simulation optimization with continuous decision variables. This algorithm is referred 
to as “STRONG” (Chang et al. 2007; Chang et al. 2012). STRONG is a new response 
surface framework that combines the advantages of traditional RSM with TR methods. 
More specifically, STRONG follows the iterative “design-experiment” search strategy 
of traditional RSM, and applies the trust-region updating techniques between iterations 
to achieve the desired automatic and local convergence properties.  
In this paper, we present an application of the combined Response-Surface (with Latin 
hypercube designs) and Trust-Region method, following a similar structure as 
STRONG, to the constrained simulation optimization (with continuous variables) 
problem of a primary insurer in a natural catastrophe insurance market with explicit 
representation of key stakeholders. The optimization problem has a game theoretical 
structure and involves an expected utility-based homeowner decision model, a 
constrained stochastic optimization model for insurer, as well as a state-of-the-art 
regional catastrophe loss estimation model. The complicated structure of this problem 
and high dimensional data result in non-smooth functions and expensive function 
evaluations, which challenge the general non-gradient based heuristic optimization 
methods (e.g., Genetic Algorithms, Simulated Annealing), as well as the traditional 
non-automatic RSM. We utilize an automatic Response-Surface and Trust-Region 
algorithm to optimize the primary insurer’s and homeowners’ response within the 
supply-demand relationship embodied in a stochastic economic system, which is a 
new area of application of RSM and TR. The models and algorithm are applied to a 
full-scale case study for hurricane risk to residential buildings in Eastern North 
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Carolina. In comparison with Simulated Annealing, the algorithm is shown to be 
efficient yielding a better solution more quickly for this problem. 
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
2.1 Modeling framework 
In this study, homeowners, primary insurers, reinsurers and the government are 
assumed to be the key stakeholders in the natural catastrophe insurance market. 
Individual behaviors and the interactions between the key stakeholders are captured by 
several interactive models developed in Kesete (in progress). More specifically, 
homeowners’ insurance purchasing behaviors are captured by an expected utility-
based decision model, while primary insurer’s pricing and risk transfer decisions are 
optimized through a stochastic optimization model (Figure 3.1). The loss model 
provides an estimate of the distribution of losses at the level of the individual property 
to both the insurer and individual homeowners. We assume that the reinsurer simply 
offers reinsurance based on the liabilities the insurer acquires according to a static 
formula.  Finally, we assume that the government, in order to control insolvency on 
the part of the primary insurer, places requirements on the cash reserves to be held by 
the primary insurer proportional to the magnitude of their liabilities.  No game 
theoretic interactions are considered for the government and reinsurer in this modeling 
framework.  
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Figure 3.1: Modeling framework 
2.2 Loss model 
The loss model includes both hazards simulation and loss estimation for each home in 
the study region. The hurricane hazard is represented by an efficient set of 
probabilistic hurricane scenarios. Each hurricane scenario h  has an associated 
hazard-adjusted annual occurrence probability hP  such that when probabilistically 
combined, the set of hurricane scenarios represents the regional hazard (Apivatanagul 
et al. 2011). We used the set of 97 probabilistic hurricane scenarios developed in 
Apivatanagul et al. (2011), using the Optimization-based Probabilistic Scenario (OPS) 
method. Furthermore, how hurricanes occur over time can create very different 
outcomes for insurers. To address this, we use the collection of 2000 equally possible 
long-term timelines of hurricane occurrence, called scenarios, developed in Peng 
(2013). Each scenario spans 30 years with 20 time periods in each year. More 
specifically, for a given scenario s, at time period t, which hurricane h (or no 
hurricane) occurs is represented by a binary indicator variable sthr  that is one if 
hurricane h occurs under scenario s at time t and zero otherwise. 
The inventory of residential buildings are classified into high (H) and low (L) risk 
regions, denoted as [ , ]v H L ; and further divided into groups, where each is defined 
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by its geographic location i (e.g., census tract), building category m, and resistance 
level c. Finally, the simulated loss, under hurricane h, for a single home of type i, m, c, 
v, as h
imcvL , is estimated from the catastrophe loss model developed in Peng et al. 
(2013). 
2.3 Homeowner model 
All homeowners of the same type i, m, c, v are assumed to behave the same, but the 
decisions can vary across different i, m, c, v types. We assume each homeowner’s 
purchase decision for insurance maximizes utility represented by a Constant Absolute 
Risk Aversion (CARA) utility function of the form ( ) 1 vxU x e   , where v  is the 
Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion for homeowners in risk area [ , ]v H L , and x 
refers to expenditures (negative values) – either from natural disaster damage or 
insurance payments. More specifically, for a given price 
vp  per dollar coverage for 
risk area [ , ]v H L , and associated also given deductible level d, the homeowner’s 
objective function (Eq. 1) is to maximize the probability weighted sum of utilities over 
all possible hurricanes h with probability hP , if the homeowners buy insurance (first 
term) and if they do not (second term), where the binary decision variable representing 
the insurance purchase decision is denoted as 
imcvw . In the first case, the homeowner 
losses are the premium, defined as price per dollar coverage times the expected loss, 
( )h h himcv imcvh P L B , and the loss up to the deductible level 
h
imcvB  (Eq. 2). In the 
second case, the homeowners bear the entire loss h
imcvL  resulting from hurricane h. If 
having insurance results in the higher expected utility, 
imcvw  will equal one, 
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indicating insurance is purchased; otherwise, the associated 
imcvw  will equal zero, 
indicating that not purchasing insurance results in higher expected utility. We also 
assume each homeowner has a maximum budget for insurance equal to a specified 
percentage (
vk  for people in different regions) of their home value mV  (Eq. 4); and 
the insurer will not sell insurance to the homeowner if the premium is less than some 
specified level   (Eq. 5).  
      max (1 )
imcv
h h h h h h h
imcv v imcv imcv imcv imcv imcvh h hw
w P U p P L B B w P U L           
 (1) 
min( , )  , , , ,h himcv imcvB L d i m c v h                      (2) 
 0,1   , , ,imcvw i m c v                          (3) 
    , , ,h himcv v imcv v mhw p P L V i m c v                    (4) 
    , , ,  h himcv v imcvhw p P L i m c v                    (5) 
2.4 Insurer model 
The insurer is assumed to be a net profit maximizer (Eq. 6), who sells insurance with 
different prices , [ , ]vp v H L  per (expected) unit coverage in each risk region. These 
prices are assumed to be one plus a specified administrative loading factor   and a 
profit loading factor 
v  to be determined by the optimization (Eq. 8). Each policy has 
a standard deductible d to homeowners which is the same in the two risk regions. 
Homeowners’ decisions of whether to buy the insurance or not are based on the 
utility-based model described in Section 2.2, and are denoted ( )vO p  (Eq. 9). The 
resulting premium collected from insured homeowners in each risk region is 
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represented as price 
vp  times the expected insured loss vQ  (Eq. 13). For managing 
the insured (catastrophe) risk, a single layer of excess of loss reinsurance is assumed 
as the main option for the primary insurer to hedge risk and avoid insolvency. More 
specifically, denote A, M, and  as the attachment point, maximum limit, and co-
participation percentage of the reinsurance treaty, respectively. In the event of a 
hurricane h, the loss to insured buildings from both risk regions  hL  (Eq. 10) is 
divided among the homeowners, primary insurer, and reinsurer. The homeowners pay 
the first portion of the loss up to the deductible d, denoted as hB  (Eq. 11 and Eq. 12); 
the reinsurer pays % of any loss above the attachment point A and up to a maximum 
limit of ( )M A , denoted as hq  (Eq. 14); and the primary insurer pays the 
remaining loss. Based on the loss simulation model (Section 2.1), the annual loss sye  
transferred from primary insurer to reinsurer (without timing participation rate) under 
year y of scenario s could be calculated (Eq. 15). Correspondingly, for the transferred 
risk, the reinsurance treaty requires the primary insurer to pay an annual premium syr  
(Eq. 16), which includes a base premium b (Eq. 17 and Eq. 18) (Kunreuther and 
Michel-Kerjan 2009), and reinstatement payments defined as pro rata amount of the 
expected reinsurer loss without adjusting for the length of the treaty’s remaining term 
(Eq. 16). Finally, the insurer’s net profit syF  in year y of scenario s refers to its total 
homeowner premiums collected minus its liabilities, which include the loss adjustment 
expenses portion of the premiums collected, the insured losses not covered by the 
deductibles and the reinsurance policy as well as the annual payment to the reinsurer 
(Eq. 7). We assume the administrative loading factor  , deductible level d, co-
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participation percentage   and other reinsurance premium parameters (i.e.,   and 
g ) to be known inputs. The insurer’s decisions are then reduced to the profit loading 
factors , [ , ]v v H L  , the attachment point A, and the maximum limit M of the 
reinsurance treaty. 
In this study, we further assume the insurer will start its business with an initial 
investment 0sC  (under any scenario s) that equals k (user-specified constant) times 
the annual premiums received from homeowners of all building inventories in all risk 
regions (Eq. 19); and in each year y under each scenario s, it will reallocate its 
accumulated surplus syC  greater than its initial investment amount by reinvesting in 
other lines of business or distributing it to investors as dividends (Eq. 20). If insurer’s 
accumulated surplus in year y equals zero or less, we assume that the insurer becomes 
insolvent, and the profit syF  and surplus syC  are set to zero for the remaining years 
( 1, , )y Y  for the scenario s.   
The problem that the insurer is facing can then be summarized as choosing the 
appropriate price levels and reinsurance treaty, which together determine its liability 
and profitability. Furthermore, the credibility for operation by the primary insurer is a 
small chance of bankruptcy over a 30-years business life as defined in Equation 24, 
where s  is a binary indicator variable that is one if the insurer becomes insolvent at 
any time (during the 30-year period) in scenario s and zero otherwise (Eq. 21), and   
refers to a user-specified upper limit of insolvency rate over 30 years. Also, the State 
insurance regulators require the insurer’s capacity ratio (also known as the leverage 
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ratio) to be less than three in any year. The capacity ratio is defined as the net written 
premiums divided by the policyholder surplus (denoted as sy  in Equation 22). This 
requirement ensures that the insurer has the ability to honor claims in an extraordinary 
year. The regulatory capacity ratio requirement is represented as a constraint in the 
model, as defined in Equation 25, where sy  is a binary indicator variable that is one 
if the insurer’s capacity ratio exceeds three in year y of scenarios s and zero otherwise 
(Eq. 23), and   refers to a user-specified upper bound of this violation probability. 
Therefore, the insurer’s problem is a constrained simulation optimization problem to 
maximize Equation 6 subject to Equations 7 through 25. 
, , ,
1
max
H L
sysyA M
F
SY 
                          (6) 
    =   ,sy sth h sth h sy syv v vv v t y h t y hF p Q Q r L r B e r s y             
  (7) 
1   [ , ]v vp v H L                           (8) 
* ( )  , , ,imcv vw O p i m c v                        (9) 
*   h himcv imcv imcvimcvL w L X h                     (10) 
*   h himcv imcv imcvimcvB w B X h                    (11) 
 =min ,   , , ,h himcv imcvB L d i m c v                   (12) 
 *   [ , ]h hv imcv imcv imcvimcv hQ w P L X v H L                (13) 
  min max ,  0 ,    h hq L A M A h                  (14) 
( )
  ,sy sth h
t y h
e r q s y

                     (15) 
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    ,
sy
sy h h
h
e
r b P q s y
M A
  

                  (16) 
 (1 ) h h
h
b P q g                         (17) 
 
sy
sy h h
h
e
std e P q
M A
  
   
   
   
                 (18) 
0   s v vvC k p Q s                          (19) 
 , 1min ,    ,sy s y sy v vvC C F k p Q s y
                  (20) 
=1  if ,  s.t. 0; =0  otherwise  s sy sy T C s                 (21) 
(1 )
  ,   
sy
v vsy v
sy
p Q r
s y
C


 
 

                  (22) 
1  if 3;  0  otherwisesy sy sy              (23) 
1 s
sS
                              (24) 
1 sy
sySY
                             (25) 
3. SOLUTION PROCEDURE 
By substituting the homeowner model with a response function of the form (Eq. 9), 
the entire optimization problem is represented by the insurer model only (Eq. 6 
through Eq. 25), with four continuous decision variables. To apply RSM, these 
variables are coded as described in Myers and Montgomery (2002). 
To solve the constrained simulation optimization problem, we transform the 
constraints (Eq. 24 through Eq. 25) into penalty functions and add them to the original 
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objective as follows (Eq. 26), where 
1 2( ), ( )    refers to user defined penalty 
functions for the constrained terms. These penalty functions disappear when the 
underlying constraint is satisfied but impose a negative penalty on the objective based 
on the magnitude of the violation when the underlying constraint is not satisfied.  The 
problem is then simplified as an unconstrained simulation optimization with four 
continuous variables (Eq. 26). 
1 2
, , ,
1 1
max ( ) ( )
H L
sy
sy s sy
s syA M
F
SY S SY 
     
 
    
 
 

         (26) 
Consistent with STRONG, we adopt a sequential two-stage solution procedure for this 
maximization problem, with the first stage constructing and optimizing a first-order 
polynomial approximation through steepest-ascent search, and the second stage 
constructing and optimizing a second-order polynomial approximation by efficient 
quadratic programming methods (e.g., conjugant gradient) (Figure 3.2). However, our 
solution procedure differs from STRONG in two aspects. Firstly, we utilize Latin 
hypercube experimental design with random pairing of decision variables in each 
stage, instead of factorial or fractional factorial design in the first stage and central 
composite design in the second stage as described in Chang et al. (2007). Since the 
influence of each variable on the output is not precisely known in advance, factorial 
design with high levels would result in large number of combinations. For example, a 
full factorial design of 4 variables with 4 levels of values would result in 44 =256  
design points. On the other hand, in a Latin Hypercube, each factor has as many levels 
as there are runs in the design; and the levels are spaced evenly from the lower bound 
to the upper bound of the factor. In other words, a Latin Hypercube design with 256 
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points would sample each variable from 256 uniformly distributed levels of value, 
which is very important when the range of a decision variable lies in millions or 
billions (e.g., A and M of our model). Moreover, Latin hypercube design with random 
pairing treats all design variables with equal consideration and has been proven to be 
as efficient as full factorial designs when paired with polynomials in fitting functions 
(Hussain et al. 2002).  
Secondly, our solution procedure simplifies the second stage, due to a heavier 
emphasis on the redesign of the Latin Hypercube experiments instead of using a sub-
program to guarantee improvement/satisfaction in each iteration. In the second stage 
of STRONG, a sub-algorithm is adopted after trust region update, if the trust region is 
reduced due to unsatisfactory increase in the ratio. The sub-algorithms keep improving 
the local solution by adding more design points and re-solving the problem with new 
trust regions until it reaches a satisfactory increase ratio. It should be noted that the 
sub-program needs to accumulate design points and track rejected solutions, which 
requires significant memory. Moreover, the sub-algorithm is useful when the local 
approximation is poor or there is sampling error, but it is not necessary otherwise. In 
our study, the Latin Hypercube design with a large number of random pairings 
typically results in good local model fitness in each iteration, and there is no sampling 
error in our simulation-optimization problem. As a result, we omit the sub-algorithm 
in the second stage.  
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Figure 3.2: Solution procedure (based on STRONG in Chang et al. (2007)) 
4. CASE STUDY 
4.1  Inputs 
We conducted a full-scale case study for hurricane risk to residential buildings in 
Eastern North Carolina. The study area includes 503 census tracts. Those that are on 
the coast are divided into three zones based on the distance to the coastline. This 
creates 731 geographic zones i that we can reasonably assume are homogeneous in 
flood depth within each zone. Eight categories m of wood-frame buildings with 68 
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possible resistance levels c are examined for their hurricane risk and considered as the 
insurance customers. All the residential buildings are then associated with either the 
high or low risk region v, based on the risk levels as defined by the insurer. The high 
risk region is assumed to be within 2 miles to the coast, while the low risk region is 
everywhere else. The resultant building inventory has high dimensional structure and 
reaches about one million in total.  
The risk aversion parameter values 
v  used in the homeowner utility model are 
estimated using National Flood Insurance Program data. Specifically, values of 
v  
are chosen so that given our assumed utility model, they would result in the 
penetration rates reported in Dixon et al (2006). The final parameter values are 
53.0(10 )H
  and 51.7246(10 )L
  for high and low risk areas, respectively (Gao 
2013). The homeowner insurance budgets for these two risk areas are assumed to be 
5%Hk   and 2.5%Lk   of building value. A minimum premium $100   is 
required by insurer to sell insurance in this study.  
The input parameter values for the insurer model include $2500d  , co-participation 
factor 95%  , primary insurer administrative loading factor 0.35  , reinsurer 
loading factor 0.1  , reinsurer risk attitude 0.1g  , factor defining allowed surplus 
3k  , maximum allowable thirty-year probability of insolvency 0.1  , maximum 
allowable capacity ratio violation rate 0.1  . Further, based on the results from 
screening experiments, the weights of penalty terms in the transformed objective 
function (Eq. 26), are selected to be 
1 27 7, 7 7e e   .   
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Finally, as described in the loss model definition, the simulation of the hurricane 
hazards was represented by an efficient set of H=97 probabilistic scenarios, with 
S=2000 independent thirty-year (600 time steps) timelines of hurricane occurrence 
(i.e., scenarios s). 
4.2 Results 
We implemented the combined Response-Surface and Trust-Region method in 
MATLAB (R2012a) and utilized “rsm” and “trust” statistical packages under R 
(2.13.0) for regression analysis and the related optimization. The two-stage automatic 
program was executed in parallel on a Unix machine with 12 cores. In the first stage, 
the screening experiment was constructed by a Latin hypercube design of 240 pairs of 
the four decision variables in each iteration; while in the second stage, 120 pairs of 
Latin hypercube design points were automatically generated in each iteration. During 
the trust region updating process, if the reduction ratio is below 5%, the radius of the 
new trust region is reduced by 75% (i.e., 25% of current radius length); if the 
reduction ratio is above 90%, the radius of the new trust region is increased by 1.5 
times (i.e., 2.5 times of current radius length). The algorithm stops either if the size of 
the trust region radius is below 1e-4, or reaches 30 iterations in the second stage. On 
average, each trial finished within 80 minutes, and the final result satisfies all the 
constraints. 
To check the result quality and efficiency, we also applied simulated annealing (SA), a 
non-gradient based heuristic optimization algorithm to solve this problem. Similarly, 
the optimization was implemented in MATLAB (R2012a) and executed in parallel on 
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the same machine. The initial values of the decision variables and the program 
parameters were determined based on 100 initial evaluations of average change in cost 
for an uphill move. Transitions were made randomly within neighborhoods of +/- 0.2 
from the current loading factors, 
L  and H  and +/- 200 million from the current 
reinsurance terms, A and M. Each trial of the algorithm includes 1000 iterations, and 
requires approximately 3.75 hours. The results converge well with the last 100 
iterations of each trial exhibiting only 0.01% improvement in the objective function, 
and all constraints are satisfied. 
Table 3.1 compares these two algorithms in terms of the decision variable values, 
objective function values, and computation time. The variable values from the two 
algorithms are each within 10%, and the automatic RSM-TR method produces a better 
solution than SA (3% better in objective function/net profit value), and uses only a 
third (35%) of the computational time.  
 Table 3.1:  Comparison between RSM-TR and SA 
 RSM-TR 
Simulated  
Annealing 
Difference 
H  1.4444 1.4848 -3% 
L  1.1562 1.2388 -5% 
A 2.3608e8 2.5017e8 -6% 
M 2.8911e9 2.7543e9 5% 
Objective function value 5.5838e7 5.4272e7 3% 
Run time (per trial) 1.33 hours 3.75 hours -65% 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this study, we applied the combined Response-Surface-Methodology (RSM) and 
Trust-Region (TR) method (following STRONG structure) to the constrained 
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simulation optimization of natural catastrophe insurance market. The optimization 
problem has a game-theoretical structure and involves three interacting models. We 
conducted a full-scale realistic case study for hurricane risk to residential buildings in 
Eastern North Carolina, with high dimensional input data. The automatic program was 
utilized to solve the complicated and computationally-demanding optimization 
problem, and also compared with Simulated Annealing (SA) for result quality and 
efficiency. The results from both algorithms satisfies the constraints, and the automatic 
Response-Surface and Trust-Region method outperforms SA in both result quality and 
computation time.  
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APPENDIX 
Homeowner Model Risk Parameters Calibration 
1. The NFIP Premium Structure 
The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 separated the flood insurance ratemaking 
process into two distinct categories, namely, chargeable premium (subsidized) rates 
and estimated-risk premium (actuarial) rates. Actuarially rated policies are charged 
premiums that consider the full range of possible losses, including catastrophic levels. 
The application of these two rates of NFIP depends on whether buildings have been 
constructed after the issuance of a Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM) or before the 
issuance of the FIRM. New buildings (Post-FIRM) are charged full-risk premiums that 
contemplate the full range of loss potential including catastrophic levels. Full-risk 
premiums are also charged to all buildings that are outside the Special Flood Hazard 
Area. By statute, highly subsidized premiums have been made available for Pre-FIRM 
buildings in the Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA). The distribution of business 
written in 2010 is anticipated to be 22% at subsidized rates and 78% at full-risk 
premium rate (refers to Actuarial Rate Review of the NFIP, pages 4-14, 34). 
2. Actuarial Rate and Standard Deductible of NFIP in 2010 
Prior to the four hurricanes of 2004, program premium were 125% of the historical 
average loss year.  Due to the adverse experience of 2004 and 2005, new rules have 
been adopted in ratemaking. The written premium based on all rate and rule changes 
through October 2010 is expected to be 123.5% of the adjusted historical average loss 
year. This would imply a loading factor of 1.235 for the low risk region.  
FEMA estimates that the premiums for subsidized policyholders are between 40% and 
45% of fully actuarial premiums. If we take 40% as the subsidization rate, then the 
loading factor for the SFHA area is going to be 0.341. (Refer to Actuarial Rate Review 
of the NFIP, pages 4-14, 34) 
On October 1, 2009 the NFIP discontinued the $500 deductible for all properties. Pre-
FIRM buildings in Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs) will have a $2,000 standard 
deductible. Post-FIRM buildings and Pre-FIRM buildings rated as Post-FIRM in 
SFHAs will have a $1,000 standard deductible. Buildings in non-SFHAs will have a 
$1,000 standard deductible. As a result, $1000 is considered as the standard deductible 
in our study, and the calibration process is based on this assumption as well. (Refer to 
FEMA’s NFIP rate-revise announcement in 2009) 
3. Penetration Rate of NFIP 
From the RAND report of penetration rate on NFIP, which used parcel data sampled 
from communities (in 2004), the national penetration rate for Single-Family Homes 
(SFHs) based on address matching in SFHA areas is 50% and 1% in non-SFHA areas. 
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In the South region (where North Carolina is classified into), the penetration rate for 
SFH(s) with 95% confidential interval is 61% [54~69%] in SFHA and 3% [0.8~5%] in 
LR regions (refers to RAND report 2006, pages 14-20). 
Table A.1 Market Penetration Rate for SFHs Based on Address Matching 
 
 
 
Figure A.1 FEMA Region 
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Figure A.2 Map of communities in sample 
Until 2010, no reform of NFIP has been adopted by the congress, despite of various 
proposals it received (FEMA 2010). Thus, we would expect the market penetration 
rate to stay at the same level. However, as pointed in the Figure A2.1, there are almost 
no communities sampled in eastern North Carolina. But, North Carolina is included in 
the “South” region classification of FEMA. As a result, the 60% and 3% penetration 
rates are not accurate enough to be applied in our study region. Thus, it might be more 
reasonable to use the national penetration rate (50% for SFHA and 1% in non-SFHA 
areas) instead. 
4. SFHA and non-SFHA Buildings Inventory Classification 
In our study area – Eastern North Carolina, consist of 503 census tracts, residential 
buildings in each census tract are classified into three zones based on their distance to 
water. However, this definition does not necessarily match the SFHA and non-SFHA 
areas classification of NFIP.  Even though, our 3-zone definition should not differ too 
much from the NFIP definition. More specifically, all inland buildings (in zone 1) 
should be classified as non-SFHA areas, while risk-prone areas (zone 2 and 3, 0-2 
miles to water) could be considered as SFHA areas.  
Besides, since the distribution of business written in 2010 is anticipated to be 22% at 
subsidized rates and 78% at full-risk premium rate, (i.e. 22% to be SFHA pre-FIRM 
subsidized buildings, 78% to be low risk buildings). We would need to match this rate 
by modifying our new definitions.  
Under the 3-zones definition, zone 1 (inland) accounts to 69.64% of total building 
inventory; while zone 2 (1-2 mile to water) accounts to 14.28% of total inventory and 
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zone 3 (0-1 mile to water) accounts to 16.07% of total inventory. (Together, zone 2 
and 3 account to 30.36 %.) If we assume subsidize occurs in both zone 2 and 3, and 
full premium applied in zone 1 only, we would over-subsidize the insurance (since 
30.36% > 22%). So, based on the subsidization distribution and building inventory 
configuration, we made the following adjustment: 
a) All buildings in zone 1 (inland) are considered to be in low risk areas (non-
SFHA) and are applied with full premium; 
b) All buildings in zone 3 (0-1 mile to water) are considered to be in SFHA areas 
and are apply subsidized premium; 
c) Partial of zone 2 (1-2 mile to water) are included in SFHA definition as well 
for subsidization; the rest of zone 2 is considered as low risk areas without 
subsidization (43% of zone 2 buildings are subsidized, while the rest 57% are 
applied with full premium); 
d) Under these modifications, 21.6% of total inventory are subsidized while 78.4% 
are applied full-premium. 
5. Risk Parameters Calibration Process 
CARA utility function: 
( ) 1 xU x e    
From the above information, our calibration process is aiming to find the optimal risk 
parameters that could match the following relationship: (Denote the subsidized 
premium rate and building inventory as SFHA, the full-premium rate and building 
inventory as LR) 
1.235,  (1 ) ( ) , ,  ( )
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After experimenting with 120 pairs of random ( , )H L   uniformly distributed in [1e-
3, 1e-6], and [1e-4, 1e-6] respectively, response surface method (least square 
regression) is adopted to describe the relationship between  and penetration rate in 
order to backward calculate or find the optimal parameter value.  
1)  Result for low risk (non-SFHA) region 
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~ ( ) ( ) constant
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Adjusted R-square = 0.969 
Coefficients: 
             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept) -0.024603   0.001982  -12.41   <2e-16 *** 
x1           0.226548   0.009161   24.73   <2e-16 *** 
x1^2        -0.095416   0.008752  -10.90   <2e-16 ***          
Note: x1 refers to the coded value ---
6
4 6
10
1
10 10
Lx
 
 



, where 6 4[10 ,10 ]L
  .        
Residual standard error: 0.006943 on 117 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.9696,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.969  
F-statistic:  1864 on 2 and 117 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16 
Finally, by using the fitted relationships and plug the 3% or 1% target value into the 
equations, the calibrated parameters values are: 2.7948 5L e   or 1.7246 5L e    
respectively. 
 
Figure A.3 Calibrated utility curve for non-SFHA (low risk) region of Eastern North 
Carolina 
2)  Result for high risk (SFHA) region 
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Adjusted R-square = 0.7598 
Coefficients: 
            Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)  0.30833    0.01064   28.98   <2e-16 *** 
x1           0.77892    0.04917   15.84   <2e-16 *** 
x1^2        -0.59852    0.04699  -12.74   <2e-16 *** 
Note: x1 refers to the coded value ---
6
3 6
10
1
10 10
Hx
 
 



, where 6 3[10 ,10 ]H
  .   
Residual standard error: 0.03727 on 117 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.7639,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.7598  
F-statistic: 189.2 on 2 and 117 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16 
Though theta ranges from [1e-3~1e-6], the penetration varies between [40~50%] and 
could not exceed 56% no matter what value of theta. Finally, by plugging the 49% or 
56% target value into the equations, the calibrated parameters values are: 
3.052 4H e   or 5.97 4H e    respectively. 
 
Figure A.4 Calibrated utility curve for SFHA (high risk) region of Eastern North 
Carolina 
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6. Risk Parameters Values and Resulted Utility Curves 
Based on the results from previous section, we select the risk attitude parameters 
associated with 1% and 49% penetration rate in low and high risk areas 
correspondingly for the homeowner model. More specifically,               and 
              . The utility curves based on the selected values are listed below. 
 
Figure A.5 Selected utility curve for residents in low risk region 
 
Figure A.6 Selected utility curve for residents in high risk region 
              
               
